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UNSAFE SEWAGE SLUDGE OR BENEFICIAL 
BIOSOLIDS?: LIABILITY, PLANNING, AND 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES REGARDING THE LAND 




Commentators have identified fear of liability as a major deter-
rent to the widespread land application of sewage sludge. Liabil-
ity issues regarding land application include not only legalliabil-
ity, but also market liability as a result of negative public per-
ceptions of the land application of sewage sludge. Under current 
law, municipal sewage treatment facilities, landowners, farmers, 
and even lenders are potentially liable for risks arising from sew-
age sludge application, unless someone else assumes the risk 
through a clear and legally enforceable mechanism. This article 
introduces this complex, evolving, and contentious environmental 
issue. It investigates the various siting and toxic tort liability 
issues associated with the land application of sewage sludge, and 
explores some of the risk-sharing mechanisms developed to mini-
mize the liabilities associated with the application of sewage 
sludge to farmland. It concludes with a recommendation for a 
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public indemnification fund to compensate for losses caused by 
land application of sewage sludge. 
INTRODUCTION 
Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs) treat sewage at ap-
proximately 16,000 treatment facilities across the nation.1 Sewage 
sludge is the residual solid, semi-solid, or high-solid content liquid 
material remaining after treated municipal wastewater is discharged 
into local waterbodies.2 Before these residuals can be used on agricul-
tural or nonagricultural land, or be sold to homeowners for garden 
use, sewage sludge must undergo additional treatment to stabilize 
and disinfect it. 
There has been an ongoing and heated discussion about whether to 
call these residuals "sewage sludge" or ''biosolids.''3 This debate is a 
reflection of the larger controversy regarding the environmental im-
pacts of this material. While the original term "sewage sludge" indi-
cates a mudlike deposit originating from sewage,4 "biosolids" refers 
to the potential beneficial properties of this recyclable resource.5 In 
this article, the original term "sewage sludge" is used, since the defini-
tion of the term ''biosolids'' varies with the context in which it is used.6 
1 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, No. EPAl8321R-97/003, CLEAN WATER NEEDS 
SURVEY REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1996: ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS FOR PUBLICLY OWNED WASTE-
WATER TREATMENT FACILITlES, CORRECTION OF COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOWS AND MAN-
AGEMENT OF STORM WATER AND NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTlON IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1997) (available at http://www.epa.gov/owm.htm). 
2 See Standards for the Use or Disposal of Sewage Sludge, 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 9386 (1993). 
S See Nora Goldstein, National Overview of Biosolids Management, 39 BIOCYCLE 63, at 67 
(Dec. 1998). 
4 See RANDOM HOUSE, WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1262 (1992) (sludge-noun, term 
in use since 1640-1650, "1. mud, mire, or ooze; slush. 2. a deposit of ooze at the bottom of a body 
of water. 3. Any of various mudlike deposits or mixtures. 4. broken ice, as on the sea. 5. sediment 
deposited during the treatment of sewage."). 
6 See MERRIAM, WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1998) (''biosolid-noun, term 
in use since 1977, solid organic matter recovered from a sewage treatment process especially 
as fertilizer, usually used in plural."). 
6 The EPA uses the term "sewage sludge" in its regulations but has replaced this term with 
''biosolids'' in its guidance documents. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, No. EPAI8321R-
931003, A PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE EPA PART 503 BIOSOLIDS RULE 1 (1994) [hereinafter 
PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE]. The Water Environment Federation, a technical and educational 
organization of more than 41,000 water quality professionals and specialists, uses the term 
''biosolids'' to refer to sewage sludge that is stabilized and disinfected for beneficial use. See 
WATER ENVIRONMENT FEDERATlON TASK FORCE ON WASTEWATER RESIDUALS STABILIZA-
TION, WASTEWATER RESIDUALS STABILIZATION 1 (1995). The Potash & Phosphate Institute 
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In 1995, about 6.4 million dry tons of sewage sludge were produced 
in the nation's POTWs.7 With the construction of additional POTWs 
and improvements in wastewater treatment, this number will cer-
tainly continue to rise. The disposal options for this waste byproduct 
of modern sewage treatment methods are continuing to narrow, albeit 
at a slower pace due to the increased number of land application sites 
and mega-landfills. This narrowing of disposal options began when 
President Ronald Reagan signed into law the federal Ocean Dumping 
Ban Act on November 18, 1988, making it illegal to dump sludge into 
the ocean after December 31, 1991.8 Dumpers unable to meet the 
deadline faced a series of increasing fines and penalties. At that time, 
nine municipalities in New York and New Jersey were dumping 
sludge into the ocean.9 The enactment of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act 
prompted what was called the "sludge war" in Congress, as repre-
sentatives from New York, New Jersey, and other East Coast states 
grappled with the phaseout of ocean dumping.tO When the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency) banned the use 
of the twelve-mile New York Bight dump sight and forced sludge 
dumping to 106 miles offshore, New York and New Jersey were forced 
to compromise in September 1992.11 The new agreement included 
penalty and fee provisions for those still dumping, and stipUlated that 
penalty and fee moneys were to be placed in a trust, to fund research 
on alternative disposal methods.12 New York City, in January 1993, 
became the last municipality to halt its ocean dumping practices, and 
thus ended ocean sewage sludge disposal.t3 Mounting environmental 
defines biosolids as manure and sewage sludge. See Heavy Metals in Soils and Phosphatic 
Fertilizers, PPIIPPICIFAR Technical Bulletin, (Potash & Phosphate Institute/Potash & Phos-
phate Institute of CanadaIFoundation of Agronomic Research, Norcross, G.A.), Apr. 1998, at 
1-2. 
7 See W.W. Edgar et al., Assessment of the 1996 Disinfection Practice Survey on Biosolids 
along with additional information from WEF Disinfection Committee and WEF Residu-
alslBiosolids Committee, Water Env. Fed. 71st Ann. Conf. Exposition, 479-94, 483 (1998) (This 
estimate is based on 117 POTWs and supplemental information from state and federal regula-
tors.). 
8 Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
9 See Reagan Signs Law Restricting Ocean Disposal of Sewage Sludge, Industrial, Medical 
Wastes, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1484, 1485 (Nov. 25, 1988). 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See George Ravenscroft, Managing a Special Waste: Sewage Sludge, N.J. EFFLUENTS, Mar. 
1992, at 3. 
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and economic pressures forced policy and decisionmakers to examine 
viable disposal alternatives for our nation's sewage sludge. 
Section I of this article discusses the various sewage sludge stabi-
lization and disposal options available. Section II provides the rich and 
controversial regulatory history of sewage sludge, and Section III 
reviews the siting issues that have arisen surrounding the land appli-
cation of sewage sludge. Section IV explores the possible legal issues 
associated with siting sewage sludge land application projects. The 
remaining sections address possible toxic tort liability of sludge man-
agement actors. Potential common law and statutory liability is dis-
cussed and several risk-sharing mechanisms are examined. A recom-
mendation for dealing with liability management is then offered. 
I. SEWAGE SLUDGE STABILIZATION AND DISPOSAL OPTIONS 
There are three main disposal alternatives for sewage sludge: (1) 
landfilling; (2) incineration; and (3) land application.14 Before being 
applied to land, sewage sludge must be stabilized and disinfected to 
reduce pathogens, the attraction of vectors (disease transmitting or-
ganisms like flies and rodents), and the potential to emit odors.15 The 
same is true for landfilling unless the sewage sludge in the landfill is 
covered daily.16 Also, since some biological stabilization and disinfec-
tion methods also reduce the volume of sewage sludge that must be 
disposed, sewage sludge is sometimes stabilized before being inciner-
ated.17 
A. Sewage Sludge Stabilization and Disinfection 
During stabilization and disinfection, pathogens are either signifi-
cantly reduced (Class B) or reduced below detectable levels (Class 
A).18 Class A treatment methods can be compared with pasteurization 
of milk or cooking of foods, where high temperatures significantly 
reduce or kill pathogens in order to prevent the risk of disease trans-
mission.19 Class B stabilization methods reduce pathogens to higher 
14 See Standards for the Use or Disposal of Sewage Sludge, 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 9249 (1993). 
15 See id. at 9337--38. 
16 See id. at 9346. 
17 See Ravenscroft, supra note 13, at 15. 
18 See Standards for the Use or Disposal of Sewage Sludge, 40 C.F.R § 503.32 (1998). 
19 See generally Uta Krogmann & Lisa S. Boyles, Rutgers Cooperative Extension, Land 
Application of Sewage Sludge (Biosolids), Pathogens (1999) (unpublished fact sheet on file with 
authors). 
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levels than Class A stabilization, so site and crop restrictions are still 
necessary. Site and crop restrictions for Class B sewage sludge keep 
potential pathogens from human contact until environmental condi-
tions, like sunlight, lower the pathogen density in the sludge so that 
pathogens are no longer a risk.20 Major stabilization methods include 
anaerobic digestion, aerobic digestion, lime stabilization, compo sting, 
advanced alkaline stabilization, and heat drying. The characteristics 
of the different end products and the levels of pathogen reduction are 
summarized in Table 1 of the Appendix. 
1. Anaerobic Digestion, Aerobic Digestion, Lime Stabilization 
Anaerobic digestion, aerobic digestion, and lime stabilization are 
the most common methods of sewage sludge stabilization. While an-
aerobic and aerobic digestion are biological methods, lime stabilization 
is a chemical method. Lime stabilization is a very simple and inexpen-
sive method, where lime is added to the sewage sludge to raise the 
pH of the sewage sludge to twelve after two hours of contact.21 Both 
aerobic and anaerobic digestion reduce the volume of sewage sludge 
solids that require disposal. Another benefit of anaerobic digestion is 
the generation of methane, which can be used as an energy source. 
Anaerobic digestion is only economical for larger communities due to 
the high capital costs involved. Aerobic digestion, an energy-intensive 
process, is typically found at smaller POTWs. However, all three 
methods-anaerobic digestion, aerobic digestion, and lime stabiliza-
tion-produce in most cases only a Class B sewage sludge. Since the 
use of Class B sewage sludge is more stringently regulated than Class 
A sewage sludge, there is an increasing interest in Class A stabiliza-
tion methods, such as composting, alkaline stabilization, and heat 
drying. 
2. Composting 
Projects for composting sewage sludge, or co-composting with mu-
nicipal solid waste (MSW), or yard waste, have increased in recent 
years. In 1998, there were 321 sewage sludge composting projects 
operating around the country.22 Composting is used mostly by com-
20 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9351. 
21 See 40 C.F.R. § 503.48. 
22 See Nora Goldstein & Kevin Gray, Biosolids Composting in the United States, 39 BroCYCLE 
63, at 63 (Jan. 1999). 
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munities that produce relatively low volumes of sewage sludge,23 and 
is often limited by the lack of long-term markets for the finished 
compost. The stigma attached to sewage sludge and sludge-derived 
products, stemming from public concern over potential increased con-
centrations of pollutants in soils and the resulting possible adverse 
environmental effects, continues to be the major obstacle to finding 
markets for compost.24 Furthermore, composting can be expensive 
and uncontrolled odors can expose sites to potential nuisance liabil-
ity.25 In order to reduce nuisance liability, odor treatment at compost-
ing sites has improved substantially in recent years.26 
3. Advanced Alkaline Stabilization 
Advanced alkaline stabilization neutralizes harmful pathogens in 
the sewage sludge by adding liming agents to increase pH above 
twelve for at least seventy-two hours, with temperatures held above 
fifty-two degrees Celsius for at least twelve hours during this period.27 
Quick lime, hydrated lime, or cement kiln dust are added to solidify 
the material, and the product has been used as a liming agent in 
agriculture or as daily cover and capping material at MSW landfills.28 
Cases of public nuisances arising from the odor of this material have 
been reported.29 In addition, cement kiln dust itself may be contami-
nated because cement kilns sometimes burn hazardous wastes.30 
23 See Ravenscroft, supra note 13, at 5. 
24 A bill WIIB introduced in the New York State Legislature requiring that all fruits and 
vegetables grown with sewage sludge-derived-products be labeled. See Legislation Would 
Require Labeling of Food Grown on Sludge Fertilized Land, 28 Env't Rep. (BN A) 485, 485 (July 
11, 1997). A sewage sludge-derived- product is sewage sludge that ha.s been treated and then 
altered, either physically or chemically, to be put into a form that can be marketed to the general 
public. Some of these products are advanced alkaline stabilized sewage sludge, composted 
sewage sludge and pelletized sewage sludge. See Biosolids Working Group of Rutgers Coopera-
tive Extension, Guidelines for Land Application of Sewage Sludge in Agriculture (Oct. 1998) 
(unpublished draft on file with authors). 
26 For example, a 192-acre landfill in West Virginia in which large amounts of sewage sludge 
imported from other states were converted to compost WIIB held to be a public nuisance and 
ordered closed. See West Virginia Landfill Ordered Closed Because of Failure By Owner to 
Control Odor, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 896, 896 (Aug. 16, 1996). 
26 See Goldstein & Gray, supra note 22, at 74. 
27 See Ravenscroft, supra note 13, at 5. 
28 See id. at 5, 15. 
29 See id. at 15. 
30 Cement kiln dust is a controversial hazardous wlIBte and its generators are regulated under 
RCRA. See Regulatory Determination-Cement Kiln Dust, 43 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1705 (Jan. 10, 
1997). 
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4. Heat Drying 
Another stabilization technique is the heat drying of sewage sludge. 
Heat drying technology can be used for sewage sludge stabilization 
in two ways. In the first method, dryers are sometimes used, after 
dewatering sewage sludge in presses or centrifuges, as a single proc-
ess to reduce the weight and volume of the sludge so that it may be 
transported for disposal.31 In the second method, heat drying is also 
used as part of a process to create a usable end product that flows 
easily and can be used in fertilizer mixes.32 This pelletizing process 
uses heat to dry the sewage sludge to between ninety and ninety-five 
percent solids, thus reducing volume and killing pathogens before the 
sewage sludge is turned into pellets and sold as fertilizer.33 Heat 
drying is most often performed by private companies, which some-
times add nitrogen to increase the fertilizing value of the sewage 
sludge.84 One significant drawback to this process is that the drying 
uses a substantial amount of energy. For example, dryers employed 
to dry ten tons per day will use 10,000 to 20,000 cubic feet of gas per 
hour.36 
B. Landfilling 
In 1995, about twenty-five percent of sewage sludge in the United 
States was landfilled by co-disposal with MSW, by disposal in sludge 
monofills, or by use as landfill cover in MSW landfills.36 In a few states, 
this amount was much higher (e.g., Nevada-75%; New Mexico-73%; 
Rhode Island-60%; Louisiana--45%).37 In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the number of available landfills decreased. Based on the tighter 
supply of landfill space and greater recognition of the beneficial prop-
erties of sewage sludge, a few states, including New Jersey, enacted 
legislation banning or limiting the amount of sewage sludge that could 
be disposed of in landfills.3s Currently, however, because of the in-
crease in the number of so-called mega-Iandfills,39 landfill space is 
31 See Ravenscroft, supra note 13, at 5. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 5, 15. 
35 See id. at 5. 
36 See Edgar et aI., supra note 7, at 484, 492. 
37 See id. at 486-88. 
38 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-42 (West 1998). 
39 See Bob Brown, King o/the Heaps: Ever-Growing Landfills Achieve New Heights, WASTE 
NEWS, Oct. 26, 1998, at 5. 
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abundant. So for some communities, the landfilling of sewage sludge 
is the least expensive alternative.40 Additionally, the increased inter-
est in bioreactor landfills contributes to this trend, since the addition 
of sewage sludge as inoculum in bioreactor landfills is a potential 
benefit.41 In bioreactor landfills, the decomposition of waste is control-
led within the landfill environment, which lowers long-term risks to 
humans and the environment from the landfill gas and leachate.42 In 
contrast, central European countries have either already banned or 
soon will ban the landfill disposal of wastes with a high organic matter 
content, like sewage sludge and MSW. This is in order to minimize the 
long-term risks oflandfills.43 
C. Incineration 
About sixteen percent of municipal sewage sludge is combusted in 
the United States.44 The most prominent advantage of this disposal 
method is the destruction of organic pollutants and the reduction in 
total volume of sewage sludge.46 The volume reduction can translate 
into reduced transportation costs. However, these cost reductions will 
most likely be offset by rising facility capital and operating costs 
driven by public concern over air emissions and ash residue disposal, 
coupled with tightening federal regulation of particulate emissions.46 
Thus, combustion is usually a very costly alternative. However, incin-
eration and land application are increasingly used in central European 
countries where landfilling of sewage sludge is or will soon be 
banned.47 
D. Land Application 
Land application can be defined as the use of sewage sludge or 
sludge-derived products, like compost, alkaline stabilized materials, 
and pellets, on agricultural land, nonagricultural land (forests, recla-
40 See Goldstein & Gray, supra note 22, at 66-67. 
41 See D.R. REINHART & T.G. 'IbWNSEND, LANDFILL BIOREACTOR DESIGN AND OPERATION 
149 (1997). 
42 See id. at 1, 105. 
43 See Uta Krogmann et aI., Biosolids and Sludge Management, 70 WATER ENV. RESEARCH 
557, 557 (1998). . 
44 See Edgar et aI., supra note 7, at 484,492. 
46 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9260. 
46 See Michael Richman, EPA May Hold Biosolids Incinerators to Strict CAA Emissions 
Standards, WATER ENV'T & TECH., Sept. 1997, at 24. 
47 See Krogmann et aI., supra note 43, at 557-58. 
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mation sites, parks, etc.), and in home gardens. For use in home 
gardens, composts or pellets are distributed and marketed in bags or 
containers. EPA has increased its emphasis on land application of 
sewage sludge as a beneficial use because this option closes the natu-
ral nutrient cycle; moreover, land application is often the cheapest dis-
posal option.48 Land application represents the most common method 
of sludge management in the United States.49 Since 1988, land appli-
cation of sewage sludge has increased from thirty-three percent of all 
sewage sludge generated to fifty-nine percent today.50 One of the 
reasons for this increase is the comparative deregulation of land ap-
plication of sewage sludge.51 
Sewage sludge contains a significant organic matter content, and 
also contains micro- and macronutrients essential for plant growth. 
Micronutrients required by plants to remain healthy, such as zinc, 
chromium, iron, and copper, are usually not found in significant quan-
tities in commercial fertilizers.52 Sewage sludge, or sewage sludge-de-
rived products, can be used as sources of micronutrients, liming ma-
terials, or as soil amendments Crable 1 of the Appendix). Methods 
of application depend on the physical characteristics of the sewage 
sludge and the receiving soil and on the type of crops grown. Liquid 
sewage sludge may be applied with tractors, tank wagons, irrigation 
systems, and special application vehicles, as well as by injection under 
the surface layer of the soil. On the other hand, dewatered sewage 
sludge, compost, alkaline stabilized sewage sludge, and pelletized 
sewage sludge may be applied in the same manner as chemical fertil-
izers or animal manure.53 A striking example of land application oc-
curred when the major floods of 1993 dumped tons of sand on agricul-
tural lands in the Greens Bottom flood plain in Missouri, making the 
land unsuitable for satisfactory crop yields. Sewage sludge was 
spread on 1500 acres in order to restore the organic matter that had 
washed away. Instead of having to wait the average five years for a 
significant crop yield, farmers in that region were able to grow pro-
ductive crops in two years.54 
48 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9257-58. 
49 See Ravenscroft, supra note 13, at 5. 
60 See Edgar et aI., supra note 7, at 484, 492. 
61 See infra notes 147, 152 and accompanying text for a discussion on the regulatory history 
of the final Part 503 rule. 
62 See Mary Jost, Land Application Brings Farms Back to Life in Missouri After 1999 Flood, 
WATER ENv'T & TECH., Dec. 1994, at 32. 
63 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9259. 
64 See Jost, supra note 52, at 32. 
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Although land application of sewage sludge can substantially im-
prove land productivity, and also represents a cheap and technologi-
cally viable option for many communities, it has limits and risks. 
Odors are the most annoying problem for neighbors of farmers who 
apply sewage sludge. In addition, if sewage sludge is improperly 
handled, pollutants (trace elements or persistent organic chemicals) 
and pathogens (viruses, bacteria, or parasites) in sewage sludge could 
potentially contaminate soils, crops, livestock, and even humans.55 For 
example, successive sewage sludge applications to land can result in 
an accumulation of heavy metals in the soil. This accumulation can 
potentially result in soil concentrations of metals that are toxic to 
plants, soil organisms, animals, and humans along the food chain. In 
a report assessing the risks of sewage sludge land application, EPA 
identified fourteen potential exposure pathways resulting from such 
land application:56 
1. Sewage sludge» Soil» Plant» Human (Consumer of plant 
products) 
2. Sewage sludge» Soil» Plant» Human (Home gardener) 
3. Sewage sludge» Human (Child eating sewage sludge) 
4. Sewage sludge » Soil » Plant » Animal » Human 
5. Sewage sludge» Soil» Animal» Human (Animals ingest sludge 
directly) 
6. Sewage sludge » Soil » Plant» Animal 
7. Sewage sludge» Soil» Animal 
8. Sewage sludge » Soil » Plant 
9. Sewage sludge » Soil » Soil organism 
10. Sewage sludge» Soil» Soil organism» Soil organism predator 
11. Sewage sludge » Soil » Airborne dust » Human 
12. Sewage sludge » Soil » Surface water» Human 
13. Sewage sludge» Soil» Air » Human 
14. Sewage sludge» Soil» Ground water» Human 
Pathway 3 (a child eating sewage sludge), pathway 6 (an animal over 
a lifetime of eating plants grown on sludge-applied soil), and pathway 
65 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9258. 
66 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REP. No. EPA832-B-93-005, A GUIDE TO THE 
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8 (plant phytotoxicity) were considered the most likely pathways in 
the EPA risk assessment.57 
Due to the large number of potential contaminants in sewage sludge 
and the complexity of the contamination pathways just described, 
land application of sewage sludge has endured a tortured regulatory 
history. 
II. REGULATORY HISTORY OF SEWAGE SLUDGE 
A. Pretreatment Problems 
The Clean Water Act (CWA), enacted in 1972 and significantly 
amended in 1977 and 1987, directs EPA to promulgate regulations 
establishing limits on the types and amounts of pollutants that can be 
legally discharged from various industrial, commercial, and public 
dischargers of wastewater. 58 Congress recognized that regulating only 
those sources discharging effluent directly into waterbodies would not 
achieve the objectives of the CWA. Thus, the CWA also requires EPA 
to promUlgate nationally applicable pretreatment standards, which 
restrict pollutant discharges from industries that indirectly discharge 
into waterbodies by discharging into sewers.59 Pretreatment stand-
ards are implemented in the first instance by POTW s, with states and 
EPA performing backup monitoring and enforcement roles. In addi-
tion to national pretreatment standards, POTWs are also required to 
implement more stringent local pretreatment standards applicable to 
their industrial indirect dischargers where necessary to meet water 
quality standards.6o 
An indirect discharger gains a number of advantages from plugging 
into a POTW. First, because the indirect discharging industry is a 
customer of the POTW, which is the primary enforcement authority, 
the indirect discharger can expect more sympathetic monitoring and 
enforcement from the POTW than would a direct discharger from a 
state or federal permitting agency.61 Second, the Domestic Sewer 
BIOSOLIDS RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EPA PART 503 RULE 27 (1995) [hereinafter GUIDANCE 
FOR THE PART 503 RULEJ. 
67 See id. at 83. 
68 See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 
II 1996). 
69 See id. § 1317(b), (c). 
60 See General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources of Pollution, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 403.5 (1998). 
61 See WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 200 (2d ed. 1988). 
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Exclusion clause in the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) exempts any indirect industrial discharge into a sewer 
from RCRA's reporting, permitting, and treatment requirements (Le., 
such a discharge is not considered a solid waste).62 Third, an indirect 
discharger is not required to have a National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System Permit (NPDES) under the CWA.6a The agree-
ment between the indirect discharger and the POTW is incorporated 
into a local permit or contract that is often not subject to public 
participation or enforcement by citizen suits.64 Finally, indirect dis-
charge is a distinct bargain: 
Originally, an industrial user of a POTW ... was required to repay 
a portion of the federal [construction] grant corresponding to its 
percentage use of the system's total capacity. "Industrial cost 
recovery" was intended to provide funds for reconstruction and 
reparr, and to encourage an industry to choose the most cost 
effective solution to its wastewater treatment problems, whether 
it was indrrect or drrect discharge. After prolonged and concerted 
opposition from municipalities and sewerage authorities, indus-
trial cost recovery was first suspended [administratively], then 
limited to large indrrect dischargers, and finally repealed entirely. 
Thus, as the CWA now stands, there is a major federal subsidy 
for industries that "plug in" to POTWs, because they pay only 
user charges and therefore save on construction costS.65 
Because of the advantages presented to an indirect discharger, sig-
nificant amounts of toxic materials are discharged into the nation's 
sewer systems each year.66 
B. The Regulation of Sewage Sludge 
The CWA of 1977 amended section 465, which mandated only that 
EPA develop guidelines for the use and disposal of sewage sludge.67 
Pursuant to the 1977 amendments, EPA was required to issue regu-
lations that: (1) identify uses for sewage sludge, including disposal 
options; (2) specify factors to be taken into account in determining the 
62 See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994). 
63 See GoLDFARB, sU'P"a note 61, at 204. 
64 Some states, such as New Jersey, require large indirect dischargers to procure Significant 
Industrial User (SIU) permits, which are subject to citizen scrutiny and enforcement. See id. 
66 [d. at 199-200. 
66 According to an EPA study, 178,000 metric tons of waste considered hazardous under 
RCRA were discharged into POTWs during 1986. See ConfJrols Proposed on Hazardous Waste 
Discharged into Sewage Treatment Systems, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1481, 1484 (Nov. 25, 1988). 
67 See 33 U.S.C. § 1345. 
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measures and practices applicable to each use or disposal option; and 
(3) identify concentrations of pollutants which interfere with each 
such use or disposal option.68 Responding to this mandate, in 1979, 
EPA adopted guidelines for sewage sludge use and disposal when 
sewage sludge was applied to land or disposed of in landfills.69 
Specific land application considerations provided interim criteria 
for the application of sewage sludges onto land utilized for food chain 
crops.70 For example, the regulations contained limitations on the 
permissible concentration of cadmium in sewage sludge, and included 
annual application rates that progressively declined over time in or-
der to limit the cumulative loadings of cadmium.71 Limits were also 
established for PCBs, including the requirement that sewage sludge 
containing concentrations of PCBs equal to or greater than ten mg/kg 
was not to be incorporated into the soil on land used for producing 
animal feed, including pasture crops.72 The regulations also provided 
for different required levels of pathogen reduction, depending upon 
whether crops were intended for direct human consumption or for 
animals destined for human consumption.73 
The federal regulations also contained guidelines for groundwater 
protection. Under section 3-4, a sewage sludge land-application facil-
ity may not contaminate an underground drinking water source.74 The 
regulations prohibit any use or disposal of sewage sludge that causes 
the concentrations of ten trace elements and six organic chemicals in 
an underground drinking water source to exceed maximum contami-
nant levels under the Safe Drinking Water Act.75 
In 1982, in order to develop the comprehensive sewage sludge 
regulations promised in the preamble to the regulations in 40 C.F.R. 
part 257, EPA created an Intra-Agency Sludge Task Force.76 The 
Task Force recommended that the Agency develop an integrated, 
68 See id. § 1345(d)j Standards for the Use or Disposal of Sewage Sludge, 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 
9260 (1993). 
69 These regulations were co-promulgated under Subtitle D of RCRA and section 405(d) of 
the CWA. They are found in 40 C.F.R. pt. 257. 
70 See 40 C.F.R. § 257.3--.5 (1998). 
71 See id. 
72 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9261. 
73 See id. 
74 See 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-.4. 
76 See Public Health Service Act (Title XIV), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1994)j 40 C.F.R. 
§ 257.3-.4. 
76 See CECIL LUE-HING ET AL., MUNICIPAL SEWAGE SLUDGE MANAGEMENT: PROCESSING, 
UTILIZATION, AND DISPOSAL 29 (1992). 
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comprehensive regulatory structure for sewage sludge use and dis-
posal.77 In 1985, EPA presented both its program for developing sew-
age sludge regulations and the recommendations of the task force at 
workshops held in various American cities.78 
Also in 1985, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) sued 
EPA based on the Agency's failure to include sewage sludge regula-
tions in its Pretreatment Regulations (40 C.F.R. part 403).79 NRDC's 
goal was to force EPA to issue promptly sewage sludge regulations. 
The court ruled that EPA's pretreatment regulations were invalid, 
holding that "despite EPA's contention that sludge regulations are in 
place, EPA's device of incorporating other regulations [in its place] 
does not meet the statute's command for a comprehensive framework 
to regulate the disposal and utilization of sludge."so Following this 
decision, some members of Congress became concerned that, without 
valid sewage sludge regulations, industrial dischargers would be un-
able to find sewage sludge management alternatives.81 Thus, in 1987, 
Congress reaffirmed its 1977 directive that EPA develop comprehen-
sive sewage sludge regulations, setting forth a strict schedule for 
EPA to do SO.82 
C. The 1989 Proposed 503 Sewage Sludge Standards 
In response to the mandate reiterated by Congress, in 1989, EPA 
sought to regulate sewage sludge when it is: (1) applied to land for a 
beneficial purpose; (2) landfilled in sewage sludge monofills or dis-
posed of in other surface disposal sites (such as stockpiles or impound-
ments); and (3) incinerated.83 EPA believed that beneficial reuse 
should be regulated differently for home gardens, agricultural land, 
and nonagricultural land (such as land reclamation sites, forest and 
range land, parks and golf courses).B4 Thus, on February 6,1989, EPA 
proposed sewage sludge standards in Part 503 Standards for the 
Disposal of Sewage Sludge.85 
77 The task force published a document called Municipal Wastewater Sludge Use and Disposal. 
See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9261; Standards for the Disposal of Sewage Sludge, 54 Fed. Reg. 5746, 5757 
(1989). 
78 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9261; 54 Fed. Reg. at 5757. 
79 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 313 (3d Cir. 1986). 
80 [d. at 314. 
81 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9261. 
82 See id. 
83 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 5791-5855. 
84 See id. 
85 54 Fed. Reg. at 5746-5902. 
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1. Pollutants 
The proposed rule was harm-based for the use of sewage sludge on 
agricultural land and for home gardening, dictating numerical criteria 
for these uses.86 The numerical criteria were generated by human 
health risk-based mathematical models that calculated maximum con-
taminant loading rates and the levels of exposure of the most exposed 
individuals (MEl) to various environmental pathways.87 EPA pro-
posed maximum cumulative soil loading rates for ten trace elements 
(Table 2 in the Appendix) and annual soil loading rates for twelve 
organic compounds.88 
For nonagricultural land, the rule proposed limits for the same 
elements; however, the limits were not based on a risk assessment, 
but instead on the ninety-eighth percentile of the national sewage 
sludge quality data.89 
2. Pathogens and Vectors 
With regard to pathogens, the proposed rule allowed for the land 
application of three sewage sludge classes designated A, B, and C. 
Only Class A sewage sludge was to be sold to the public for hoine 
gardening because this class contained pathogens below detectable 
levels.90 There were no use restrictions regarding pathogens for Class 
A sewage sludge.91 The proposed rule specified crop and access re-
strictions associated with the use of Class B and Class C sewage 
sludge.92 
For example, if Class Band C sewage sludge were applied to food 
crops whose harvested parts were totally above ground, those crops 
could not be grown again for a period of eighteen months after appli-
cation.93 Food crops whose harvested parts were below ground could 
not be grown for a period of five years. Feed crops for animals could 
not be harvested for thirty days if Class B sewage sludge was applied, 
86 See id. at 5880. 
87 See id. at 5764-91. 
88 The organic compounds subject to EPA regulation were: total aldrin and dieldrin; 
benzo(a)pyrene; chlordane; total DDT, DDD, DDE; dimethyl nitrosamine; heptachlor; hexachlo-
robenzene; hexachlorobutadiene; lindane; polychlorinated biphenyls, toxaphene; trichlo-
roethylene. See id. at 5880. 
89 See id. at 5806. 
90 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 5888--89. 
91 See id. at 5888. 
92 See id. at 5889. 
93 See id. 
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or sixty days if Class C sewage sludge was applied. No public access 
to the site was permitted for twelve months after the Class B or Class 
C sewage sludge was applied; however, agricultural workers were 
permitted access during those periods.94 Vector attraction reduction 
requirements were established as well.96 
3. Management Practices 
Management practices for agricultural land were also required un-
der the rule. Such management practices stipulated that sewage 
sludge must not be applied in excess of the nitrogen crop requirement 
or in excess of fifty metric tons/ha, and that land application sites must 
not be closer than ten meters to surface waters.96 
The same requirements (except for the rule against applications in 
excess of fifty metric tons/ha) were also applicable to sewage sludge 
use on nonagriculturalland.97 In addition, growing food, feed crops, 
and grazing by animals was prohibited for five years after application. 
A vegetative cover also had to be established on the land. 
The management practices for sewage sludge products for home 
gardens set forth labeling information.98 The labeling information re-
quired under the proposed rule included the nitrogen concentration, 
the concentrations of the nine trace elements and ten organic com-
pounds,99 and the uses appropriate for each product. 
4. Monitoring and Record-Keeping 
EPA's 1989 proposed rule also set forth monitoring and record-
keeping requirements. Some of the record-keeping requirements for 
agricultural land were: (1) the name and address of the user who 
applied the sewage sludge; (2) the concentration of nitrogen and pol-
lutants in the sewage sludge; (3) the results of monitoring of the 
sewage sludge to determine compliance with pathogen reduction re-
quirements and vector attraction reduction requirements; (4) records 
to indicate whether sewage sludge was sub-surface injected to comply 
with the vector attraction reduction requirement; (5) the contract 
between the POTW and the user of the sewage sludge; (6) certifica-
94 See id. 
96 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 5889. 
96 See id. at 5880. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 5883. 
99 See id. 
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tion that the user was informed about the access and use restrictions 
for the land when either a Class B or a Class C sewage sludge was 
applied; (7) certification that there were at least ten meters between 
the sewage sludge-treated land and any surface water boundary; and 
(8) certification that the land was in compliance with the general 
requirements of the section. lOO 
D. Public Response to the Proposed Sewage Sludge Standards 
EPA received over 3000 pages of written comments from more than 
500 municipal sewage sludge generators, local regulatory agencies, 
environmental consultants, lobbying organizations, and private citi-
zens. IOI Sewage sludge experts immediately criticized the proposed 
rule as technically flawed, citing EPA's failure to conduct ade-
quate peer review before releasing its proposal.102 Comments from 
municipalities uniformly expressed shock at the highly conservative 
approach of EPA, which the municipalities believed would produce 
extremely restrictive numerical criteria for sewage sludge manage-
ment.I03 Many believed that the new sludge regulations ran counter 
to EPA's policy of encouraging beneficial reuse and that several facili-
ties, which EPA formerly had recognized as model reuse facilities, 
would be closed down or forced away from reuse and land application 
to more expensive methods of treatment, such as landfilling or incin-
eration. lo4 Most commentors felt that EPA had utilized unrealistic 
assumptions in its supporting data (i.e., the pollutant concentrations 
in the sewage sludge and the amount of time it takes for a pollutant 
to accumulate in soils).!05 The EPA-sponsored technical Peer Review 
Committee (PRC) was also highly critical of EPA's risk assessment 
methodology.106 The PRC criticized EPA for not keeping policy sepa-
rate from the scientific basis of the risk assessment. The PRC also 
charged that EPA had introduced unnecessarily wide margins of 
safety throughout the risk assessment by making overly conservative 
data selections and assumptions about the MEIs.107 
100 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 5896. 
101 See LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 39. 
102 See Robert G. Q'Dette, EPA's Technical Sludge Regulations May End Beneficial Reuse, 
WATER ENV. & TECH., Nov. 1990, at 31. 
103 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9267. 
104 See LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 39. 
105 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9267. 
106 See LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 43. 
107 See GUIDANCE FOR THE PART 503 RULE, supra note 56, at 20-23. 
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The primary data source regarding sewage sludge pollutants for 
EPA's preliminary assessment of health risks was a forty city study 
conducted by EPA in 1979 and 1980.108 The data in the study recog-
nized forty pollutants found in municipal sewage sludges. EPA then 
relied on calculations predicting the amounts of these pollutants that 
would be found in soils treated with sewage sludge. These predictions 
were compared to standards for drinking water in order to determine 
if a listed pollutant could adversely affect human health.109 EPA ac-
knowledged that this 1979-1980 study was outdated, and that the 
characteristics of sewage sludge had changed since then. In an effort 
to obtain more up-to-date data, EPA sent out questionnaires to a 
random sample of 479 POTWs. In November 1990, EPA published the 
National Sewage Sludge Survey: Availability of Information and 
Data, and Anticipated Impacts on Proposed Regulations, which out-
lined revisions to the originally proposed regulations.110 This notice 
included a relaxation of some of the limitations, including the allow-
able loading rates for land application. The new rates reflected per-
missible lifetime loads that were ten to twenty times higher than 
those included in the original proposal.11l 
The new proposal also set forth the concept of "Clean Sludge," a 
set of alternative pollutant limits at or below which no restrictions 
would be set on the use of sewage sludge applied to land.112 However, 
if just one of the pollutant limits was exceeded, the Part 503 manage-
ment practices and monitoring requirements would have to be met. 
This clean sewage sludge exemption allowed a sewage sludge-derived 
product meeting particular criteria to be marketed without regula-
tion, as if it were an ordinary fertilizer.ll3 
108 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 5759-63. 
109 See id. 
110 See generally 55 Fed. Reg. 47,210, 47,210-83 (1990). 
111 See also Brian Hemphrill, New Sludge Disposal Regulations: The Plot Thickens, WATER 
ENv. & TECH., Jan. 1992, at 22. See generally 55 Fed. Reg. at 47,210-83. 
112 See Hemphrill, supra note 111, at 22. See generally '55 Fed. Reg. at 47,210-83. 
113 Note, however, that under the final 503 rules, there are limits for "clean sludge." The risk 
assessment is based on the assumption that ten metric tons of sludge complying with "Excep-
tional Quality" CEQ) limits can be annually applied for one hundred years without causing harm. 
After using EQ sludge for 100 years, the pollutant loading rate would be the same as the 
cumulative pollutant loading rate which would pertain if the EQ limit were exceeded. 
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E. The Final Part 503 Rule 
In 1993, EPA finally issued the Standardsfor the Use and Disposal 
of Sewage Sludge, otherwise known as the Part 503 Rule. l14 The Part 
503 Rule covers sewage sludge that is applied to agricultural and 
nonagricultural land, sold or given away in bags or containers (in 
many cases to home gardeners), placed in surface disposal sites (such 
as sewage sludge monofills, impoundments, storage piles, dedicated 
disposal sites, and dedicated beneficial use sites), or incinerated.lI6 In 
contrast to the 1989 proposed rule, there is no distinction between 
agricultural and nonagricultural land in the rule's numerical pollutant 
limits for land application. In most cases, the rule requires compliance 
even if no permit is issued.lI6 Regarding land application, the rule 
contains pollutant limits, pathogen reduction requirements, vector 
attraction reduction requirements, management practices, and re-
cord-keeping and monitoring requirements. Although EPA did not 
use the term Exceptional Quality (EQ) sewage sludge in the regula-
tions, the term was introduced in EPA guidance documents.ll7 An EQ 
sewage sludge must comply with certain pollutant concentration lim-
its (see Table 3 in the Appendix), with Class A pathogen reduction 
requirements, and with eight options to reduce vector attraction.lIS 
1. Pollutants 
The 503 Rule sets numerical limits for ten trace elements in sewage 
sludge applied to land.lI9 In the risk assessment, allowable numerical 
limits in sewage sludge were calculated based on the application rate 
114 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9248-9415. 
116 See id. at 9256. 
116 See id. at 9323. 
117 See PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE, supra note 6, at 31-34. 
118 The options to reduce vector attraction include: Option 1: Thirty-eight percent reduction 
in volatile solids content (organic matter which attracts vectors) during sewage sludge treat-
ment; Option 2: Demonstration by additional anaerobic digestion in the laboratory; Option 3: 
Demonstration by additional aerobic digestion in the laboratory; Option 4: Specific oxygen 
uptake rate 1.5 mg/oxygenlhr/g total sewage sludge solids at 20$C for aerobically digested 
sewage sludge; Option 5: Use of aerobic processes 40$C for at least 14 days (e.g. composting); 
Option 6: Alkali additions to raise the pH to at least 12 at 25$C (77$ F) and maintain pH 12 for 
2 hours and maintain pH 11.5 for an additional 22 hours; Option 7: Reduce moisture content of 
stabilized sewage sludge to 75% solids or for unstabilized sewage sludge to 90%; Option 8: 
Reduce moisture content of unstabilized sewage sludge to at least 90% solids; Option 9: Inject 
beneath soil surface (non-EQ standard); Option 10: Incorporate sewage sludge within 6 hours 
of application (non-EQ standard). See id. at 121-25. 
119 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9318-19. 
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of ten dry metric tons per year for one hundred years.120 Additionally, 
EPA determined the ninety-ninth percentile sewage sludge concen-
tration from the Agency's National Sewage Sludge Survey.121 EPA 
chose the lower of those two values as the concentration limit for each 
pollutant and the higher value became the ceiling concentration limit 
(see Table 3 of the Appendix). If the trace element concentration is 
below the pollutant concentration limit, no additional pollutant control 
requirements must be fulfilled. If the trace element concentration in 
the sewage sludge is above the pollutant concentration, but below the 
ceiling concentration, the cumulative loading to the soil is limited by 
the cumulative loading limit. The cumulative loading limit is the same 
cumulative loading as if sewage sludge complying with the pollutant 
concentration limit were applied for one hundred years at ten metric 
dry tons per year. This cumUlative loading limit applies to both agri-
cultural and nonagricultural land. 122 
Since EPA assumed that cumulative loading rate tracking would 
not be feasible for home gardens, the Agency established an annual 
pollutant loading rate for sewage sludge exceeding the pollutant con-
centration but complying with the ceiling concentration. The annual 
pollutant loading rate is based on a twenty-year application period 
instead of a 100-year application period.123 
The final rule does not regulate organic contaminants such as diox-
ins, furans, and PCBs. However, a regulation establishing numerical 
limits for dioxins, furans, and coplanar PCBs in land-applied sewage 
sludge is expected to be promulgated by December 15, 2001.124 
2. Pathogens and Vectors 
The rule differentiates between Class A and Class B sewage 
sludges with regard to pathogen reduction. In Class A sewage sludge, 
pathogens have to be reduced to levels below those detectable by 
specific analytical methods.126 With regard to pathogens, no site or 
crop restrictions exist for Class A sewage sludge. For Class B sewage 
sludge, site and crop restrictions similar to, but more detailed than 
120 See GUIDANCE FOR PART 503 RULE, supra note 56, at 98-101. 
121 See id. at 99-101. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See U.S. EPA 7b Propose Biosolids Use and Disposal Rule, WATER ENV'T & TECH., Aug. 
1998, at 8. 
126 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9399-9400. 
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those contained in the 1989 proposal, are applicable (e.g., based on 
grazing animals, growing crops, and human contact). The final pro-
posal does not include a Class C category as proposed in 1989. Class 
A pathogen reduction requirements are an EQ standard.126 
In addition, the rule contains vector attraction reduction require-
ments. While vector attraction reduction options 1 through 8 reduce 
the vector attractiveness of the sewage sludge through stabilization, 
options 9 and 10 prevent vectors from coming in contact with the 
sewage sludge by soil incorporation or injection.127 Options 1 through 
8 are part of the EQ standard. 
3. Management Practices 
If the sewage sludge is of EQ quality, it is exempt from further 
regulatory controls and may be used freely as a fertilizer or soil 
amendment.128 Otherwise, a number of general requirements and 
management practices apply to land application.129 The application 
rate to land should be less than the agronomic rate for nitrogen, and 
sewage sludge should not be applied to the land if it is likely to 
adversely affect a threatened or endangered species.130 Firms that 
make sludge commercially available are required to label or provide 
instructions for homeowners or landscapers who purchase non-EQ 
sewage sludge-derived products, and also to provide a statement that 
application is prohibited except in accordance with the instructions on 
the label. 131 
4. Monitoring and Record-Keeping 
For EQ sewage sludge, the POTW monitors the pollutant concen-
tration and certifies that the pathogen and vector attraction reduction 
requirements have been met.l32 Additional certification and monitor-
ing is required for non-EQ sewage sludge in order to track pollutants 
and ensure compliance with site, crop, management, and other gen-
eral restrictions. In contrast to the 1989 proposed 503 rule, record-
126 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1989 Proposal's use 
of Class A, B, and C sewage sludge. 
127 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9400-01. 
128 See id. at 9390. 
129 See id. at 9391-92. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 9393-95. 
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keeping by a POTW for EQ sewage sludge is limited to the pollutant 
concentration, pathogen reduction, and vector attraction require-
ments. 
5. Response to the New Part 503 Rule 
Part 503 has been quite controversial,133 Perhaps the most serious 
criticism leveled at Part 503 is that, unlike European and Canadian 
sewage sludge standards, it does not rely on nondegradation mod-
els.lM A nondegradation approach does not permit an increase in trace 
element levels in the soil above background concentration levels as a 
result of land applications of sewage sludge. Another criticism stems 
from Part 503's reliance on fourteen different pathways of exposure 
(e.g., children ingesting sludge infused soil) to set up risk assessment 
models and then to calculate acceptable pollution limits.ls5 However, 
different risk assessment models result in different pollution limits. 
For example, the Dutch intervention values for contaminated soils are 
derived from a risk assessment. These intervention values have lower 
allowable soil concentrations for all metals, except for lead and mer-
cury, than those EPA suggests pose no significant threat from land 
application of sewage sludge.ls6 It has been argued that the Dutch risk 
assessment places more emphasis on ecotoxicological effects than 
does EPA's risk assessment.137 Some commentators question whether 
this pathway of exposure is sufficiently accounted for in the EPA risk 
assessment. In addition, even within the United States, different soil 
standards are in effect. In New Jersey, for example, the proposed 
residential soil clean-up standards for cadmium are an order of mag-
nitude lower than the allowable soil limits for cadmium accumulations 
from land applications of sewage sludge.las 
133 See generally ELLEN Z. HARRISON ET AL., THE CASE FOR CAUTION: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR LAND ApPLICATION OF SEWAGE SLUDGE AND AN ApPRAISAL OF THE US EPA's PART 503 
SLUDGE RULES (Cornell Waste Management Inst., Working Paper) (Aug. 1997, revised Feb. 
1999) (on file with authors). 
134 See generally S.P. McGrath et at, Land Application of Sewage Sludge: Scientific Perspec-
tives of Heavy Metal Loading Limits in Europe and the United States, 2 ENV. REVIEW 114 
(1994). 
130 See Videotape: Cornell Waste Management Video Conference on Biosolids Disposal (Aug. 
1996) (on file with authors). 
136 See McGrath et at, supra note 134, at 113. 
137 See id. 
138 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 (1998). 
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Moreover, there are many in the scientific community who believe 
that by utilizing plant pollutant uptake coefficients that are too low, 
EPA seriously underestimated the human ingestion of pollutants 
from plants grown in sewage sludge-amended soils.139 Other critics 
believe that the plant growth pathway should have been based on 
more conservative yield reduction thresholds and more sensitive 
crops.140 
At the same time, EPA was being sued for being too conservative 
in its pollutant limits for chromium, molybdenum, and selenium. For 
example, in Leather Industries of America v. EPA, suit was brought 
against the agency in order to challenge standards promulgated for 
chromium.141 The court held that EPA had abused its discretion by 
establishing high phytoxicity limits on soil concentrations of chro-
mium where studies indicated no risk of phytoxicity at concentrations 
below the limits and EPA had no reliable data on the effects of higher 
concentrations.142 This case illustrates the scientific uncertainty sur-
rounding the Part 503 regulations. 
Based on the controversy surrounding EPA's regulation of sewage 
sludge, local communities have perceived greater risks from the cur-
rent sewage sludge management system.143 Section 405(e) ofthe CWA 
states that the "determination of the manner of disposal or use of 
sludge is a local determination .... "144 Part 503 also allows generators 
to choose disposal options.145 Thus, many communities concerned 
about the possible adverse effects of sewage sludge application on 
139 See Murray B. McBride, Growing Food Crops on Sludge-Amended Land Soils: Problems 
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Method of Estimating Thxic Metal Transfer, 
17 ENVTL. 'lbXICOLOGY & CHEMISTRY 2274, 2274 (1998); Alan H. Stern, Monte Carlo Analysis 
of the U.S. EPA Model of Human Exposure to Cadmium in Sewage Sludge Through Consump-
tion of Garden Crops, 3 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 449, 452 (1993). 
140 See J.P. Schmidt, Understanding Phytotoxicity Thresholds for Trace Elements in Land-
applied Sewage Sludge, 26 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 4, 9-10 (1997); Murray B. McBride, 7bxic Metal 
Accumulation from Agricultural Use of Sludge: Are USEPA Regulations Protective? 24 J. 
ENVTL. QUALITY 5, 16 (1995). See generally D.R. Bouldin, Why Guidelines for Beneficial Use 
of Sludges in Agriculture are Different and Estimates of Alternatives (1997) (Paper for the Soil 
Sciences of North Carolina Proceedings) (on file with authors). 
141 40 F.3d 392, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Leather Industries of America filed a petition with 
the U.S. court of appeals to review the pollutant limits for chromium. EPA concluded that there 
are no data justifying the chromium regulation and subsequently removed all limits from the 
regulations. See id. at 408. 
142 See id. at 407. 
143 See Telephone Interview with Cindy Drill, Technical Operations and Product Development 
Manager, N-Viro Corp. (Nov. 14, 1997) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Drill Interview]. 
144 33 U.S.C. § 1345(e). 
146 See 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 9375 (1993). 
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public health and safety have attempted to reject waste generated 
elsewhere by enacting ordinances that ban the spreading of sewage 
sludge.146 
F. The Current Sewage Sludge Management System 
Due to claimed administrative constraints, it is now common prac-
tice for some states to practice the "honor system" with regard to land 
application of sewage sludge.147 In most cases, the state will not keep 
track of how much waste is applied or where. If the sewage sludge is 
an EQ sewage sludge like most sewage sludge composts, pelletized 
sewage sludges, and advanced alkaline materials, these products can 
be marketed like any other fertilizer or soil amendment.l48 However, 
even for non-EQ sewage sludges, most states will not keep track of 
how much waste is applied or where. The POTWs typically do not 
sign contracts with the landowners who accept the non-EQ sewage 
sludge, but rather they hire a land applier to remove the sewage 
sludge and locate farmers willing to take it. The land applier keeps 
records regarding where the sewage sludge is applied and when, but 
is not required by Part 503 to report this information to the POTW.149 
The land applier usually signs a contract with the landowner; thus 
there is no direct link between the landowner and the POTW. The 
POTW is required to obtain a 503 Permit, while the sewage sludge 
applier is not. If a POTW provides sewage sludge to a person who 
does not change the sewage sludge quality, the POTW retains the 
responsibility for the ultimate use and disposal of the sewage sludge 
and must ensure that Part 503 requirements are met.160 Thus, permit 
compliance is left entirely in the hands of contract sewage sludge 
146 See infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of communities' efforts to 
ban sewage sludge land application. 
147 Such is the case in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. See Susan Q. Stranahan, Honor System 
for Use of Sewage Sludge Raises Furor: State Lifts Controls on Fertilizer with Sludge, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, May 6, 1997, at AI. 
148 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
149 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPAl831-B-93-002b, LAND ApPLICATION OF SEW-
AGE SLUDGE, A GUIDE FOR LAND ApPLICATION ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL 
STANDARDS FOR THE USE OR DISPOSAL OF SEWAGE SLUDGE 30 (1994). 
160 Furthermore, POTW operator liability may result in criminal penalties, especially since the 
Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding 
plant operators criminally liable for discharges and defining ''knowing'' violations under the 
CWA as taking place when defendant knows he is discharging the pollutant in question, not 
when he knows that he is violating the terms of the statute or permit). If a POTW performs 
obligations under Part 503, however, criminal liability is unlikely. 
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haulers with little regulatory stake in the management of the sewage 
sludge they apply. Land appliers are neither permitees nor land-
owners.l6l This anomalous situation presents problems for POTWs 
whose non-EQ quality sewage sludge is applied directly to farmland. 
Consequently, municipalities either sell sludge to companies that con-
vert it to EQ quality, or else install their own processing facilities. l52 
III. SITING ISSUES REGARDING THE LAND APPLICATION OF 
SEWAGE SLUDGE 
New York City recently faced local challenges to contracts it main-
tained with Merco Joint Venture to land-apply Class B sewage sludge 
to Texas grasslands.15s Caroline County and Culpeper County, both in 
Virginia, have adopted ordinances banning the land application of 
sewage sludge. 1M Many other localities are actively fighting the land 
appli~ation of sewage sludge in their communities.l55 
With most environmental laws, implementation of extensive regu-
latory frameworks have awakened public interest in the nature and 
extent of environmental problems. This increased awareness has in 
turn sparked local interest in programs that affect the quality of the 
local environment.156 Increased participation by local government in 
the environmental arena can enhance environmental protection by 
151 However, in the recent case of United States v. Cooper, the Ninth Circuit held that 
nonpermitees/sludge haulers can be held liable for permit violations under certain circum-
stances. No. 97-50296, 1999 WL 194191 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 1999). In that case defendant sludge 
hauler contracted with the City of San Diego to transport excess sewage sludge to Mexico. See 
id. The City had received a NPDES permit, which included the location where the excess 
sewage sludge was to be shipped. See id. After Mexican authorities detained trucks carrying 
defendant's sewage sludge, he decided to land apply the sewage sludge at a local farm instead, 
without notifying the City or receiving a new permit for such application. See id. The court held 
defendant criminally liable for permit violations even though he was not the permitee because 
there was ample evidence that the defendant knew of the City's NPDES permit and its 
application to his conduct. See id. 
152 Middlesex County Utilities Authority in New Jersey has constructed, in conjunction with 
N-Viro Soil, the largest processing facility in the country and markets products to area farmers 
and topsoil manufacturers. See N-VIRO INTL CORP., PROCESS & FACILITY TECHNICAL INFOR-
MATION BOOKLET (1998) (on file with authors). 
163 See Westen Kosova, Sludge on the Range, AUDUBON, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 71, 73. 
154 See Cy Jones, Sludge-Disposal Dispute Pits Local Conditions Against a National Policy, 
WPCF JOURNAL, Aug. 1990, at II. 
155 See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
166 This momentum can most clearly be seen in the Right-to-Know movement. Many local 
communities have right-to-know ordinances, which require varying degrees of disclosure from 
handlers of hazardous waste. See Hazard Communication Report, 14 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1899, 
1899 (Mar. 2, 1984). 
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tailoring federal and state programs to fit local needs and concerns. 
But on the other hand, local governments are particularly sensitive 
to public outrage, and may thus exacerbate the "not in my backyard" 
(NIMBY) syndrome.167 In addition to the siting issues discussed be-
low, land application of sewage sludge in areas inhabitated predomi-
nantly by minority and low-income populations may be complicated 
by "Environmental Injustice" claims.168 
The sewage sludge management issue illustrates both the positive 
and negative aspects of local environmental regulation. For example, 
California has 500,000 acres of prime agricultural land situated along 
the San Joaquin Delta. The Regional Resource Control Board for this 
area decided to follow Part 503 and issue land application permits.169 
But just when local farmers began to rely on these land application 
permits, the Delta Protection Commission, along with San Joaquin 
Valley County, adopted local ordinances banning the land application 
of sewage sludge on agricultural land. 160 
As the nation strives for long-term effective management of sew-
age sludge, local controls such as the ban imposed by the Delta Pro-
tection Commission are becoming more prevalent.161 The popularity 
of local bans on sewage sludge land application is due primarily to the 
common perception that state control over the Part 503 process is 
insufficient to protect local health and safety.l62 And to some extent, 
these fears are not unfounded. EPA has de-invested in Part 503, while 
diverting fiscal resources to other programs under the CWA.I63 EPA 
has allowed regional offices to issue site-specific permits at their own 
167 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY; NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 1143-44 (2d ed. 1998). 
168 See Goshen Rd. Envt. Action Team v. United States Dep't of Agric., 1999 WL 187264 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing an African American 
neighborhood group's suit against U.S.D.A. alleging violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 with regard to the siting of a facility for the land treatment of municipal waste-not 
land disposal of sewage sludge). See generally PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, ch. 8, 25. 
169 See Telephone Interview with Ron Liebert, Associate Counsel, California Farm Bureau 
(Nov. 14, 1997) (notes on file with authors) [hereinafter Liebert Interview]. 
160 Stanislaus County is also currently planning prohibition. A recent case also mandated that 
the State Water Resource Control Board must prepare a statewide E.I.R. examining the land 
application program in two to three years. See Liebert Interview, supra note 159. 
161 Attempted bans may also take the form of indirect restrictions or requirements such as 
zoning restrictions, buffer requirements, or soil, groundwater, and surface analysis require-
ments that make the cost of land application noncompetitive. 
162 See Liebert Interview, supra note 159. 
163 See Michael Richman, Status of Site-Specific Bio80lids Permitting Unclear; EPA Pulling 
Back, WATER ENV'T & TECH., Dec. 1996, at 24. 
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pace, while proclaiming that Part 503 is self-implementing.164 The 
states have also followed the self-implementation approach. States 
such as Pennsylvania and New Jersey no longer keep track of how 
much sludge is applied or where.165 Responsibilities have shifted to 
plant operators.166 
As the Part 503 structure becomes less centralized, local attempts 
at control will become even more prominent. Thus, it is necessary to 
examine the validity of local challenges to land application. Local 
ordinances restricting and banning the spreading of sewage sludge 
may be challenged in the legal forum in two ways. First, local bans 
may be challenged on the ground that they are preempted by state 
and federal law. 167 And second, local controls may be challenged on the 
ground that they are a threat to the national political and economic 
unity established under the dormant Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution.16s In a recently decided case, Welch v. Board of 
Supervisors of Rappannock County, the federal district court for the 
Western District of Virginia upheld a county ordinance banning the 
land application of sewage sludge against both types of challenges.169 
After Welch, the commercial sewage sludge industry was reluctant to 
bring any more challenges against local ordinances on preemption and 
dormant Commerce Clause grounds.170 However, the ruling in Welch 
is not as dispositive as it seems, and may be open to attack. So the 
question remains as to whether local ordinances, banning the land 
application of sewage sludge will be upheld in the face of challenges 
by the industry. 
A. Preemption Challenges 
Some states preempt local governmental units from utilizing land 
use controls to regulate the land application of sewage sludge, while 
164 See id. at 25. 
166 See Stranahan, supra note 147, at AI. 
166 The states estimate that they will save $83 million in paperwork and monitoring. See id. 
at A14. 
167 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 328. 
168 See id. at 344. 
169 888 F. Supp. 753, 759 (w.n. Va. 1995); see also United States v. Cooper, No. 97-50296, 1999 
WL 194191 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 1999) (affirming the decision in Welch, holding that regulations do 
not usurp local control over the disposal of sewage sludge). 
171) Instead, industry increased pressure on state legislatures to enact preemptive legislation. 
See Drill Interview, supra note 143. 
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others either explicitly recognize the authority of local governments 
or are ambiguous in defining the role of local entities.l7l 
1. Existing Preemption Jurisprudence 
There are three ways in which local ordinances banning land appli-
cation may be preempted: express preemption, implied preemption, 
and actual conflict.172 Express preemption is explicit in state or federal 
statutory language. Implied preemption is used when no express 
statements are made in the statutory language. In deciding whether 
there is implied preemption, courts look to whether the federal or 
state law occupies the field of sewage sludge management.173 For 
example, in Holgate Property Associates v. Thwnship of Howell, the 
court decided that New Jersey's Solid Waste Management Act 
(SWMA), in its application to specially derived sewage sludge prod-
ucts, preempted local zoning and police power ordinances and thus 
barred the exercise of municipal authority over activities involving 
sewage sludge derived products.174 Howell Township served Holgate 
with a stop work order to prevent the company from transporting 
composted sludge to a sand quarry for distribution to landscapers.175 
Holgate filed suit, claiming that the SWMA preempted Howell from 
enforcing its ordinance because the SWMA presents a comprehensive 
statutory and regulatory scheme that completely occupies the field of 
solid waste management, even though general statutory language 
exists authorizing local regulation of threats to health and safety.176 
The court analyzed the statutory language and agreed, concluding 
171 An example of state preemption may be seen in Ohio. A proposal to ship 50,000 dry tons 
of New Jersey sewage sludge to Ohio every year for application to farmland has drawn fire from 
local citizens, who formed Citizens Concerned about Sludge in the State of Ohio. The Ohio 
Environmental Protection Agency approved a request by Wheelabrator, Inc. to truck Passaic 
Valley, N.J., sewage sludge to Ohio. Because Ohio state law specifically preempts local govern-
ments from utilizing land use control to regulate this type of situation, local governmental units 
can do nothing to address citizen concerns. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.21 (West 1998). 
172 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 328. 
173 See generally Perry v. Providence, 578 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Talbot County v. 
Skipper, 620 A.2d 880 (Md. App. 1993); Michigan Disposal, Inc. v. Augusta, 280 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. 
App.1979). 
174 679 A.2d 613, 616 (N.J. 1996); see also Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 507 S.E.2d 
460, 463-M (Ga. 1998) (holding that Georgia's state statute regulating the application of sewage 
sludge on land implicitly preempted a county land application ordinance establishing a duplicate 
permit system that was not authorized by the general law). 
176 See Holgate, 679 A.2d at 614. 
176 See id. at 615. 
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that the legislature recognized management of solid waste to be a 
statewide system entailing a degree of expertise that transcends the 
capacities and interests of local government.177 Provided that land 
application of sewage sludge conforms to state permitting require-
ments, courts have consistently held that land application is a normal 
agricultural practice, and thus it is often protected from local regula-
tion.l7S 
In Talbot County v. Skipper, the Maryland Court of Appeals held 
that the Maryland Code implicitly preempted a Talbot County ordi-
nance requiring landowners to record certain information in the 
county land records before applying sewage sludge to their land in 
accordance with state permits.179 Bio-Gro Corporation, a commerical 
sewage sludge provider, and the farmers with which it contracted, 
filed suit against the county. The plaintiffs alleged that the state, by 
enacting comprehensive legislation, preempted the field of sewage 
sludge land application.lso The court held that state law governing 
sewage sludge application impliedly preempts local law when the local 
law deals with an area in which the state legislature has acted with 
such force that intent by the State to occupy the field must be im-
plied.lsl The court reasoned that because the statute specifically rec-
ognized and provided for local control under certain circumstances, 
those areas not mentioned were intended to be preempted.l82 Lastly, 
177 However, the court also recognized that because of the significant impact that state-level 
decisions would have on local affairs, there is an implied duty on the state to consider local 
concerns and allow for local participation, even though the statute does not require it. See id. 
at 616. But see Holmes v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Jasper County, 634 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ind. 
App. 1994) (holding that the board of zoning appeals refusal of a special exemption for the 
spreading of residential septage was not preempted by the state's Environmental Management 
Act because there was nothing in the act that contained a hint of preemption and the board's 
actions were not inconsistent with the act). 
178 See County of Grundy v. Soil Enrichment Materials Corp., 292 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1973). Although Right to Farm Statutes are typically enacted to protect farm operations 
from nuisance liability they also may be used to prohibit local ordinances from regulating farm 
activities and agricultural uses of the land. The rationale behind their preemptive power is that 
as rural areas become more developed, the political power of farmers declines and members of 
the nonfarming community may exercise influence to control agricultural activities. Thus, these 
laws attempt to protect farming operations from developmental pressures by broadly defining 
the agricultural activities that warrant protection. See Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas S. 
Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the 
Farmer, 1983 WIse. L. REV. 95, 125 (1983). 
179 620 A.2d 880, 880 (Md. App. 1993). 
180 See id. at 883. 
181 See id. at 885. 
1112 See id. 
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the court found the Maryland law preempted the ordinance because 
the recording requirement was not a typical type of local regulation.l83 
Thus, local controls may be preempted if a court, in its interpretation 
of a statute, concludes that there is no legislative intent to leave room 
for local regulation, and the local regulation is not one traditionally 
left to local control.184 
If local ordinances deal with issues traditionally left to local con-
trol, however, the fact that a state may have enacted extensive legis-
lation in the field of sewage sludge management does not automat-
ically imply preemption. In County Commissioners of Queen Anne~ 
County v. Soaring Vistas Properties, Inc., the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals held that Maryland's state law did not implicitly 
preempt a local zoning ordinance that controlled the location of a 
sewage sludge storage facility, because the legislature clearly contem-
plated local involvement in traditional zoning matters and issues of 
local concern.l86 The court went on to state that, although Maryland's 
sewage sludge regulations include requirements pertaining to the 
location of sewage sludge storage facilities, they do not provide an 
exhaustive list of criteria for local authorities to follow. Thus, because 
the location of the storage facility is of keen local interest, the court 
decided that this matter should be considered at the local level. Ac-
cording to the court, the state regulations were to be interpreted as 
complementing, not replacing, local zoning law.l86 
Even when there is no implied preemption, a state statute may 
preempt local control if there is actual conflict between a local ordi-
nance and state law. In Perry v. Providence Township, a town zoning 
resolution completely banning land application of sewage sludge was 
held invalid because it was in direct conflict with state law permitting 
such land application.l87 The court outlined a general test: when the 
local ordinance permits or licenses that which the state forbids and 
prohibits, and vice versa, the ordinance is in conflict with the state 
law, and is therefore preempted.l88 
183 See id. at 886. 
184 See Thlbot County, 620 A.2d at 886. But see Hempfield Township v. Hapchuck, 620 A.2d 
668, 670 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (holding that nothing in the State's Solid Waste Management 
Act discloses any implied intention to preempt local zoning regulations). 
185 708 A.2d 1066, 1075 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). . 
186 See id. at 1077. 
187 578 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). It is important to note that Ohio is not a home 
rule state, and it affords limited authority to local government. Thus, in examining preemption, 
one must first look at state enabling acts. 
188 See id. at 888; see also Michigan Disposal, 280 N.W.2d at 599. The court held that an 
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It is important to note that although local ordinances may be pre-
empted by state regulation, they may not be preempted by the CW A. 
Until recently, the preemption cases dealing with local bans of sewage 
sludge land application addressed only state preemption issues. The 
Welch case, discussed earlier, was the first case to address the issue 
of federal preemption.l89 The court held that a Virginia County ordi-
nance banning the land application of sewage sludge was not preemp-
ted by the CWA.l90 Welch asserted that the local zoning amendment 
conflicted with a national policy regarding the use and disposal of 
sewage sludge. According to the plaintiff, this policy manifested itself 
in a comprehensive program authorized by statute and effectuated by 
agency regulation. This program gave local government some role, 
but the role was not extensive enough to allow the banning of anyone 
practice of disposal or use.l9l The court rejected this argument and 
held that the ordinance did not stand as an obstacle to achieving the 
purpose of the federal law, but rather that Congress has exercised its 
power to permit states and localities to regulate the manner of sewage 
sludge disposal or use. l92 The court stated that regardless of EPA's 
general preference for land application, Part 503 left the ultimate 
determination of sewage sludge disposal and use to the states and 
localities, and thus it was clear that no preemption was intended.l93 
The court, in determining that there was no conflict between local 
regulation and federal policy, seemed to leave a place for local regu-
lation in the overall structure of Part 503, recognizing that "where the 
... local regulation addresses public health concerns, there is a pre-
sumption against preemption."l94 
ordinance regulating the land application of sewage sludge, which provided that a license shall 
be granted only if the zoning board detennined that the proposed activity would not pollute, 
impair, or destroy significant natural resources, create hazards to public health and safety, or 
result in public or private nuisance, was invalid to the extent the ordinance allowed the township 
to deny a pennit for sewage sludge application based on factors previously detennined by state 
authorities. See id. The ordinance conflicted with state controls, and was therefore preempted. 
See id. 
189 See Welch, 860 F. Supp. at 330. 
190 See id. at 331. 
191 See id. 
192 See id.; see also United States v. Cooper, No. 97-50296, 1999 WL 194191 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 
1999) (the Ninth Circuit held that CWA regulations did not preempt local ordinances banning 
land application of sewage sludge). 
193 See id. 
194 Welch, 860 F. Supp. at 331. 
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B. Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution states that 
"Congress shall have power ... to regulate Commerce ... among the 
several States."195 Because Congress holds the power to regulate, 
states or their sub-units are forbidden from passing laws that unduly 
burden interstate commerce.196 The dormant (negative) aspect of the 
clause empowers the courts to strike down legislation conflicting with 
the nationalization policies of the Commerce Clause, thereby restrict-
ing the states even when Congress has not directly exercised its 
power to preempt states.197 
1. Existing Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
In evaluating whether a local ordinance is inconsistent with the 
dormant Commerce Clause power vested in the federal government, 
the analysis is similar to regulatory takings jurisprudence.198 A proper 
grant of authority to the local government must be demonstrated, the 
ordinance must serve a proper public purpose, there must be a suf-
ficiently close means-ends relationship, and the ordinance must not 
cause an excessive burden on interstate commerce.199 
The United States Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged 
approach in dealing with cases implicating the dormant Commerce 
Clause. The initial inquiry is whether the state or local law is facially 
discriminatory or facially evenhanded.20o Discrimination, in this con-
text, simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefit the former and burden the latter.201 If 
the Court finds that the law is facially discriminatory, then the Court 
applies a virtual per se rule of invalidity. Under this rule, the law or 
local ordinance must pass the strictest level of scrutiny, meaning that 
the state or locality must show that it advances a legitimate local 
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives.202 
196 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1,3. 
196 See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). 
197 See David Pomper, Note, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce 
Clause, Postindustrial "Natural Resources," and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1309, 1313 (1989). 
196 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 507. 
199 See id. 
200 See Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99. 
201 See id. 
202 See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach,486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). 
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The second prong of the Court's analysis of dormant Commerce 
Clause issues prescribes the balancing test established in Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc.20S The test applies where a law regulates even-
handedly, with only incidental effects on interstate commerce.204 A law 
that regulates evenhandedly does not discriminate on its face and is 
valid under the dormant Commerce Clause "unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.''206 In other words, if a legitimate local purpose is found, 
then the question becomes one of degree: the burden on interstate 
commerce is weighed against local benefits in a complex calculus that 
seeks to account for local benefit and the extent of burden on the 
interstate flow of goods.206 
It is well settled that the disposal of solid waste is an article of 
commerce-the article of commerce is not the solid waste itself, but 
rather the processing and disposing ofit.207 The Court has consistently 
used the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down attempts by 
states and localities to regulate the flow of out-of-state solid and liquid 
waste across their borders.208 The benchmark case in this area is City 
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, in which the Court held that New 
Jersey could not ban the import of waste generated outside state 
borders.209 The Court found New Jersey's statute to be facially dis-
criminatory, and an attempt by one state to isolate itself from a 
problem common to many with the erection of a barrier against the 
movement of interstate trade.210 The Court categorized solid and liq-
uid waste as commodities in commerce, not as a regulated stream to 
which the Commerce Clause would not be applicable.2l1 All objects of 
interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection-none is ex-
cluded by definition at the outset.212 The Court then found that legiti-
mate local concerns of health and safety were not warranted because 
203 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
204 See id.; Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 98. 
206 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
206 See id. 
207 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. 1bwn of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994). 
208 See id.; see also Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, Inc., 504 U.S. 334,334 (1992). 
209 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
210 See id. at 628. 
211 See Stanley E. Cox, Burying Misconceptions About 1'rash and Commerce: Why it is Time 
to Dump Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 813, 829 (1991) (arguing that Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey was wrongly decided because trash is not a commodity but a regulated 
stream). 
212 See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622. 
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New Jersey banned only out-of-state wastes that were no different 
from the in-state wastes that could be legally dumped.213 
Not all laws that discriminate against out-of-state commerce are 
forbidden as protectionist measures.214 The Court has given significant 
deference to environmental measures in the determination of whether 
there is a legitimate local interest.216 It has validated state and local 
quarantine laws that prevent traffic in noxious articles, whatever 
their origin, because "their worth in interstate commerce [is] far 
outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very movement."216 
In Maine v. Taylor, the Court upheld a total ban on the importation 
of baitfish to prevent the introduction of disease.217 The Court con-
cluded that the state retains broad regulatory authority to protect the 
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural re-
sources, even though interstate commerce may be affected.21s The 
Court held that the ban legitimately protected the State's fisheries 
from parasites and nonnative species, even though the issue of 
whether there was any scientific justification of Maine's total ban was 
contested by the parties.219 
In the field of interstate movement of waste, however, parties have 
not successfully asserted this quarantine doctrine.22o In Philadelphia, 
the Court refused to accept the New Jersey legislature's alleged 
purposes of protecting health and safety because they were sought 
by illegitimate means.221 Even if the statute was structured so that it 
regulated waste evenhandedly,222 the Court might still reject a quar-
antine analysis: "a State [or sub-unit] is without power to prevent 
213 See id. at 629. The Court refused to liken the solid waste law to quarantine laws banning 
the importation of articles because of their innate harmfulness, because New Jersey was not 
regulating the transportation of waste, only its ultimate disposal. See id. at 628-29. 
214 See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (''The distinction between 
the power of the state to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety ... is one 
deeply rooted in both our history and our law .... This court consistently has [supported local 
rights] to impose even burdensome regulations in the interest of local health and safety."). 
216 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986); see also Procter & Gamble v. Chicago, 509 
F.2d 69, 79 (7th Cir. 1975). 
216 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622. 
217477 U.S. at 151-52. 
218 See id. at 148 & n.19, 149. 
219 See id. at 148. The Court found that Maine had a legitimate interest in guarding against 
imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately 
prove to be negligible. See id. 
220 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 350-51. 
221 See 437 U.S. at 626-27. 
222 For example, an evenhanded regulation of waste would include a nondiscriminatory ban 
on all waste disposal within the state. See id. at 624, 626-27. 
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privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in 
interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy 
local demands" of health and safety.223 The Court, in holding that New 
Jersey could not close its open landfills to out-of-state disposers even 
if the state's ultimate purpose in doing so was to protect health and 
safety, refused to accept solid waste disposal as endangering health 
and safety.224 
In Government Suppliers Consolidated Services, Inc. v. Bayh, the 
federal district court for the southern district of Indiana refused to 
apply the quarantine exception to an Indiana tipping fee which essen-
tially barred all out-of-state solid waste from being shipped into the 
state.225 The court relied on the decisions in City of Philadelphia, 
Illinois v. General Electric Company, and National Solid Wastes 
Management Ass'n v. Alabama Department of Environmental Man-
agement to conclude that the interstate movement of infectious waste 
could not be distinguished from the interstate movement of nuclear, 
hazardous, or solid waste, and therefore the cases in which the quar-
antine exception was used to uphold local restrictions did not apply.226 
The U.S. Supreme Court validated this decision in Chemical Waste 
Management, Inc. v. Hunt.227 The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the 
state's differential tipping fees based on the quarantine rationale 
proposed in Maine, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.228 The 
Court held that the law could not be deemed a legitimate quarantine 
law because it permitted landfilling of waste by in-state disposers,229 
and it isolated the state from the nationwide problem of waste dis-
posal. 
223 Id. at 627 (quoting Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928». 
224 See id. at 629. Admittedly, this reasoning is circular: if New Jersey banned all waste, the 
court might conclude that there were legitimate concerns of health and safety. But no claim was 
made that the movement of waste into and through New Jersey endangers health. 
226 753 F. Supp. 739, 765 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
226 See id. at 764 (citing Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622); Illinois v. General Elec., Co., 683 F.2d 
206, 214 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the importation of nuclear waste is commerce that does 
not fall within the quarantine cases); National Solid Wastes Management Assoc. v. Alabama 
Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 720-21 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that hazardous waste 
is commerce that does not fall within the quarantine cases). 
227 504 U.S. 334 (1992). 
228 See id. at 348. 
229 See id. at 343 & n.5. The Court noted that the hostility must be to the thing itself, not to 
merely interstate shipments of the thing; and an undiscriminating hostility is at least nondis-
criminatory. See id. at 347 n.11 (quoting Illinois, 683 F.2d at 214). 
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2. Welch Stands Alone in Allowing Interruption of Interstate 
Transport of Waste 
Welch is the only sewage sludge management case in which a court 
has allowed the interruption of the interstate flow of solid waste on 
local health and safety grounds.230 One reason this decision stands 
alone is that the local ordinance upheld in Welch banned all land 
application of sewage sludge, not just sewage sludge generated out-
of-state.231 Thus, local control was even-handed and the court applied 
the looser Pike balancing test, in which the regulation is given more 
deference.232 Under this test, if a legitimate local purpose is found, the 
burden on interstate commerce tolerated depends on the nature of 
the local interests involved and on whether they could be promoted 
with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.233 In Welch, the court 
noted that given the county's strong local interest in promoting health 
and safety, in order to succeed with a dormant Commerce Clause 
claim, the plaintiffs had to overcome a strong presumption of valid-
ity.234 The plaintiffs here had not overcome that presumption. 
The court concluded that the county rationally believed that the 
land application of sewage sludge posed health and safety risks, thus 
a legitimate local interest was furthered by the ordinance.235 The court 
credited the county with articulating five risks the ordinance was 
designed to protect against, including: (1) possible harm to the envi-
ronment; (2) possible harm to human and animal health; (3) loss of 
public confidence in agricultural products; (4) reduction in crop values; 
and (5) damage to tourism in the area.236 The court concluded that 
despite the scientific dispute about the safety of land application, 
there was at least a rational basis for believing that the ordinance 
would protect the health and safety of those within the county.237 
230 S66 888 F. Supp. 753, 760 (W.D. Va. 1995). 
231 Se6 id. at 755. An interesting case might be made for the market participant exception if 
the county allowed disposal of its own sludge. Under this exception the county could argue that 
they were protecting themselves as a market participant. 
232 S66 id. at 758. The County originally urged the court to rely on Kass6l v. Consolidated 
Freightway Corp., 450 U.S. 622 (1981), which held that if local safety concerns are not illusory, 
then the federal courts should not second-guess. However, the court in W6lch recogni2ed that 
a balancing is required even for health and safety ordinances. S66 id. 
233 S66 id. 
234 [d. at 760. 
235 S66 W6lch, 888 F. Supp. at 759. 
236 Se6 id. 
237 S66 id. 
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N ext, the court found that the farmers who brought suit failed to 
show that the ordinance impeded the free flow of interstate com-
merce.238 The court stated that because the ordinance did not ban 
sewage sludge disposal within the county, only land application as a 
method of disposal, the burden imposed on interstate commerce was 
de minimis at best.239 The farmers argued that the ordinance deprived 
them of the substantial economic benefits of applying sewage sludge 
on their land.240 The court held, however, that the denial of a commer-
cial interest to one particular group negatively affected by the ordi-
nance does not rise to the level of a Commerce Clause violation.241 
Thus, the local ordinance was upheld because of the nature of the local 
interest and the slight burden on interstate commerce.242 
3. Welch's Consistency with Existing Commerce Clause Doctrine 
The practical assumption is that the Supreme Court will not over-
rule the strong dormant Commerce Clause precedents established in 
the solid waste field. Thus, it is necessary to examine whether the 
Welch decision is consistent with existing Commerce Clause doctrine. 
CWA section 405(e) and EPA's Part 503 rule authorize local govern-
ments to enact controls on land application of sewage sludge.243 Fur-
thermore, a sufficiently close means-ends rationality exists because 
local bans effectively accomplish the objectives of health and safety.244 
Thus, the remaining inquiries are whether local bans, such as the 
county ordinance in Welch, avoid excessive burdens on interstate 
commerce and whether these local controls serve a proper purpose.245 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See Welch, 888 F. Supp. at 759. 
241 See id. The court, however, left open the possibility of further suits. It is possible that some 
evidence will be adduced that shows a greater burden on the free flow of sewage sludge because 
of the ordinance. The important point is that plaintiffs had failed to present significant evidence 
of such a burden. See id. at 759-60. 
242 See id. at 760. 
243 See 33 U.S.C. § 1345(e) (1994); 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 9251 (1993). The authority ofmunicipali-
ties to regulate land application of sewage sludge under the CWA is subject to State Enabling 
Acts or Right to Farm Acts, which may counteract such power. 
244 See Procter & Gamble, Co. v. Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 75-76 (7th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he means 
chosen to accomplish the end should be deemed reasonably effective unless the party attacking 
the legislation demonstrates the contrary by clear and convincing proof."). 
246 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 350-51. 
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4. Ingredients of Possible Successful Commerce Clause Challenges 
to Land Application Bans 
The court in Welch left open the possibility that a dormant Com-
merce Clause challenge might be successful against local bans.246 
First, in assessing the burden on interstate commerce, the court 
focused on the burden the ordinance imposed on farmers, disregard-
ing burdens that might be imposed on the rest of the commercial 
sewage sludge industry.247 In considering the economic perspective of 
the farmers, the court concluded that the county ordinance simply did 
not rise to the level of impediment necessary to hold it in violation of 
the Commerce Clause.248 More excessive burdens could be placed on 
the industry by states and communities, however, and those burdens 
might weigh more heavily in a judicial balancing.249 
a. Demonstrable Burden to Whole Sewage Sludge Industry 
A suit brought by the sewage sludge product industry, including 
commercial producers, brokers, and haulers/applicators, combined 
with POTWs,250 might establish more of a burden on interstate com-
merce. These plaintiffs would represent a complete industrial sector 
to be shut out of local economies if sewage sludge application bans are 
upheld. Furthermore, if incineration or landfill facilities are not in 
close proximity, POTWs will be forced to ship sewage sludge else-
where, substantially increasing transaction costs, which must then be 
passed on to customers of the POTW. 
These burdens might be compounded by the nibbling effects that 
local bans can have on the free flow of commerce. Hypothetically 
speaking, all the counties in a state could impose such ordinances, 
thereby shutting the sewage sludge industry entirely out of the state. 
The Court might conclude that this constitutes a significant burden 
on national commerce, and thus is an attempt by local communities to 
isolate themselves from a national concern, as was the case in City of 
Philadelphia.261 
246 See Welch, 888 F. Supp. at 759. 
247 See id. 
248 See id. at 759-60. 
249 The farmers' argument was weak: the denial of their profit would not obstruct the nation-
alization policies embodied in the commerce clause. See id. at 759. 
250 In some instances, municipal treatment facilities also produce sludge-derived products. 
251 See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629. 
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Under Welch, would the importance of local health and safety con-
cerns outweigh such a burden? According to the Supreme Court in 
City of Philadelphia, it could not.252 City of Philadelphia can be read 
as prohibiting states from closing open landfills, even if the states' 
ultimate purpose in doing so is to protect public health. Thus, it is 
possible that local ordinances banning land application of sewage 
sludge might be struck down as attempts to close private farmlands.253 
b. Fragile and Unsupported Claims of Danger to Health and 
Safety 
The Welch court's finding of legitimate health and safety concerns 
might also be challenged. After hearing conflicting scientific evidence 
from both sides, the court relied on the county's five areas of concern 
to find a rational belief that the ordinance would protect health and 
safety.2M Thus, at least implicitly, the court relied on a quarantine-like 
rationale to find legitimate local purpose. The concerns articulated by 
the county and relied on by the court focused on sewage sludge as a 
noxious item.255 Yet no court has ever found solid/liquid waste to fall 
within a quarantine exception to dormant Commerce Clause attack.256 
In order to justify its quarantine rationale, the Welch court classified 
sewage sludge as a regulated stream or pollutant.257 This classification 
seems contrary to the holdings in Philadelphia and Carbone.258 The 
mere fact that sewage sludge is regulated by EPA does not warrant 
the application of a quarantine rationale.259 The court in Welch failed 
to consider that sewage sludge-derived products are often exempt 
from EPA regulations (as "clean sludge") and, thus may be considered 
252 See id. Given that the Supreme Court saw no danger in solid waste disposal, it is likely it 
would not tolerate such a burden on interstate commerce. See id. 
253 See id. Farmlands are an equally scarce resource. 
264 See Welch, 888 F. Supp. at 759. However, it also seems that there was enough evidence to 
rationally conclude that land application is safe. 
256 See id. 
266 If nuclear waste and hazardous waste do not qualify for this exception, solid waste certainly 
will. See National Solid Waste Management Assoc. v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 
F.2d 713, 720-21 (11th Cir. 1990); Illinois, 683 F.2d at 214. 
267 See Welch, 888 F. Supp. at 755 ("Notwithstanding [its] apparent benefits ... sewage sludge 
is a pollutant and is regulated."). 
268 In both cases, the Court held solid waste and its processing and disposal to be commodities 
and not regulated streams. See generally C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383; Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 
at 617. 
269 Solid waste is regulated also and is defined as a commodity, not as a substance to which a 
quarantine rationale applies. See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391; Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629. 
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as fertilizers.260 Furthermore, if the county was really concerned with 
health and safety, and actually wanted to ban sewage sludge as a 
noxious item, why did it allow sewage sludge to be transported, and 
landfilled within the county?261 
5. Commerce Clause Attack Still Unlikely to Prevail 
Despite Welch's inconsistencies with existing doctrine, a dormant 
Commerce Clause attack on a sewage sludge application ban is still 
likely to be a tenuous argument.262 It is possible that the sewage 
sludge products industry could establish that bans place great bur-
dens on interstate commerce; however, it is unlikely that these bur-
dens will be deemed clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.263 Even if the economic perspective examined by the court 
included the larger sewage sludge product industry, it is also possible 
that the court might broaden the sewage sludge industry to include 
incineration facilities and landfills. Thus, a court might conclude that 
the local ordinances simply deny a commercial benefit to one particu-
lar group negatively affected by it, but do not rise to the level of a 
Commerce Clause violation.264 It is also unlikely that bans on land 
application will warrant claims of economic protectionism, because the 
ordinances ban all sewage sludge land application, regardless of its 
origin.265 
Because Welch has not been overturned, it is also possible that 
other courts will find that local ordinances serve legitimate public 
purposes. Welch's quarantine-like rationale could guide other courts 
to classify sewage sludge as a pollutant rather than a commodity.266 
Thus, local governments can more easily establish a legitimate local 
interest by arguing that sewage sludge is a noxious item that poses 
unique health and safety risks.267 Like nuisance regulations, protec-
260 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
261 No claim was made by the county that the very movement of sewage sludge through the 
county endangers health. This seems contrary to a quarantine rationale. 
21!1l This is especially so since the CWA and EPA's Part 503 Rule give local governments the 
authority to choose sludge disposal options. 
263 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
264 See Welch, 888 F. Supp. at 759. 
266 See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622 (holding that a state can limit importation of wastes to 
protect health and the environment, but that it cannot do so for simple economic protectionism). 
Philadelphia would not apply to complete bans on land application of sewage sludge, because 
such bans are nondiscriminatory. See id. 
266 See Welch, 888 F. Supp. at 759. 
267 See Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, 584 So. 2d 1367, 1379 (Ala. 1991). 
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tion of health and safety has traditionally been an area of local control, 
and courts will likely defer to local governments when they act to 
protect citizens.268 
Furthermore, lack of scientific evidence proving the dangers of land 
application of sewage sludge does not bar local health and safety 
ordinances.269 If sewage sludge is regulated as a noxious item, the local 
government has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly 
understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may 
ultimately prove to be negligible.270 Thus, it is enough that a ban can 
rationally be perceived as protecting health and safety.271 If a local 
government's determination that its regulation serves a legitimate 
public purpose is at least debatable, it is likely that a challenge to that 
action will fail. 272 
Consequently, it is unclear whether Welch will set the tone for the 
decisions of other courts addressing the issue of land application of 
sewage sludge. Welch leaves open the possibility that a heavier bur-
den on interstate commerce might be shown, and its quarantine-like 
rationale contradicts Commerce Clause doctrine in the field of solid 
waste. But at the same time, it seems unlikely that a court will find a 
burden so great as to overrule local concerns of health and safety. 
Thus, local governments may use siting as one way of protecting 
their communities from exposure to the uncertain risks of sewage 
sludge land application. However, what happens when application 
sites are poorly sited in the first place? The next section of this article 
analyzes a second way of protecting public health, via various tort 
liabilities attached to sewage sludge land application. Such liability 
can provide those affected by land application projects with causes of 
action that might deter future conduct of applicators. But will these 
tort causes of action be successful? 
268 It is well settled that the state's regulatory powers are greatest when they address 
traditional matters of local concern, such as the environment and natural resources. See Kassel 
v. Consolidated Freightways Coop., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981). 
269 See Maine, 477 U.S. at 148. 
270 See id. 
271 See Welch, 888 F. Supp. at 759. 
272 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (upholding the Filled 
Milk Act, which forbade the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded 
with fat or oil other than milkfat, on public health and safety grounds). 
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IV. ToXIC ToRT LIABILITY 
A. Common Law Liability 
Although POTWs, private actors, and farmers who choose to apply 
sewage sludge to land might be protected from local prohibitions 
against such activity by state and federal (statutory or constitutional) 
law, they still can be subject to private tort actions brought by local 
citizens. Tort law offers an aggrieved plaintiff the possibility of mone-
tary recoveries and a variety of injunctive remedies.273 
A trespass action can be brought against a polluter who physically 
invades a plaintiff's property. Damages are available for all conse-
quential injuries throughout the chain of causation, and the statute of 
limitations is typically long. Toxic tort actions based on trespass seem 
to encourage the grant of injunctions by emphasizing the unpermitted 
invasion, penetration, or incursion of a pollutant onto private prop-
erty.274 Trespass as a cause of action, however, is subject to a number 
of restrictions, most importantly that in most states it cannot be based 
on negligence liability.276 
Negligence has seldom been the sole theory of recovery in success-
ful environmental law cases. The apparent reason for the rare use of 
negligence causes of action is that in cases involving injury to prop-
erty, trespass and nuisance (or strict liability) are easier to prove.276 
Historically, in the sewage sludge management field, nuisance ac-
tions have been the most common cause of action used by private tort 
plaintiffs.277 Private nuisances occur where there is an invasion of 
reasonable interests in the use and enjoyment of land. Just as in the 
typical negligence lawsuit for damages based on injuries suffered in 
an accident, the plaintiff in a nuisance action must carry the burden 
of proving that he has suffered harm, that the defendant's conduct 
273 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 166. 
274 See id. at 189. 
276 Furthermore, it is extremely difficult for courts to determine whether a "physical invasion" 
has occurred. See id. 
276 However, one of the advantages of negligence causes of action for plaintiffs, besides its 
familiarity to the bench, is that tort claims acts waiving sovereign immunity may only cover 
negligence. Also, under some insurance policies, defendants will only be covered for accidental 
discharges, not intentional pollution, so a negligence judgment is more likely to be paid. See id. 
at 192. 
277 See generally Grossman & Fischer, supra note 178. 
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caused that harm, and that the defendant's conduct was one against 
which the law affords a remedy.278 
Land use in surrounding rural areas affects the judicial balancing 
as to whether or not there are nuisances emanating from sewage 
sludge application. Courts attempt to strike a balance between the 
plaintiff's right to reasonably use and enj oy his land and the farmer's 
right to make a reasonable use of his.279 Implicitly, the harm to the 
plaintiff is weighed against the utility of the agricultural conduct. 
Rural landowners are expected to tolerate odors and activities that 
might be characterized as nuisances in nonrural areas. The question 
then becomes: at what point do the effects of these activities become 
so overwhelming in rural areas that they become a nuisance?280 Com-
mon law nuisance is a confusing doctrine.281 It is possible for courts to 
enjoin agricultural activities when their smells become nuisances by 
interfering with the rights of others to enjoy their property.2B2 Nui-
sance actions allow citizens and government to abate activities be-
lieved to be injurious to health, safety, and welfare.283 
Historically, courts have considered a variety of factors in deter-
mining whether a farmer's practices deprive neighbors of the reason-
able use and enjoyment of their land. Such factors include the char-
acter of the surrounding area, the location and proximity of the farm 
to plaintiffs residence, the intensity and volume of odors, and gener-
ally, the overall interference with plaintiff's well being.284 For years, 
"coming to the nuisance" was a defense considered by the courts, and 
was a factor to be weighed in determining the scope of reasonable 
use.286 Despite this defense, courts usually upheld nuisance actions 
278 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 166. 
279 "In every case, the court must make a comparative evaluation of the conflicting interests 
according to objective legal standards, and the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff must be 
weighed against the utility of defendant's conduct." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS 596 
(4th ed. 1971). 
2lIJ See Woods v. Kahn, 420 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the odors and 
insect problems caused by defendant's chicken farm overwhelmingly interfered with the rights 
of others to enjoy their property, even though the area was zoned agricultural). 
281 "[I]t has meant all things to all men and has been applied indiscriminately from an alarming 
advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie." PROSSER, supra note 279, at 571 (citations 
omitted). 
282 See Woods, 420 N.E.2d at 1031. 
288 See id. 
284 See Baldwin v. McClendon, 288 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 1974). 
286 See Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer Co., 505 P.2d 919, 921 (Or. 
1973). 
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against farmers.286 Recently, however, states have deprived the courts 
of this power by abolishing the nuisance claim as a cause of action for 
adjacent landowners through the enactment of so-called "Right to 
Farm Acts.''287 
Whereas Right to Farm Acts provide protection against nuisance 
actions, they do not offer protection against actions to prohibit land 
application of sewage sludge, if this practice is considered an abnor-
mally dangerous activity. The concept of imposing liability on a land-
owner who engages in an abnormally dangerous activity evolved 
because theories of trespass and nuisance did not adequately protect 
an adjacent landowner's property rights.288 Trespass only applied to 
actual invasions of the plaintiff's property, while nuisance covered 
only activities on defendant's property that continually interfered 
with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land.289 Neither cause of action 
applied to noncontinual activity on defendant's property that indi-
rectly interfered with plaintiff's property rights. Thus, the common 
law doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity de-
veloped to fill the gaps.290 
The abnormally dangerous activity doctrine imposes strict liability 
on those who, for their own benefit, introduce extraordinary risk of 
harm into the community, despite the possible social utility of their 
activities.291 The rule reflects a policy determination that such "enter-
prise[s] should bear the costs of accidents attributable to highly dan-
gerous activities."292 Because some conditions and activities can be 
both hazardous and of infrequent occurrence, the risk of the loss is 
justifiably allocated as a cost of business to the enterprise that en-
286 See Randall Wayne Hanna, Right to Farm Statutes: Newest Thol in Agricultural Land 
Preservation, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 425-30 (1982). 
287 This has prompted what some call a rejuvination of the "corning to the nuisance defense" 
for farmers. See id. at 428. 
288 See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1256--57 (N.J. 1991) (citing 
State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983» (stating that the 
abnormally dangerous activity imposes liability on those who introduce an extraordinary risk 
of harm into the community, and that the processing, handling, and disposal of radium consti-
tuted an abnormally dangerous activity). 
289 See id. 
290 See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866) ("[T]he person who for his own purposes 
brings on his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep at his 
own peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural 
consequence of its escape."). 
291 See T & E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1256--57. 
292 W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 78,551 (5th ed. 1984). 
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gages in such conduct.293 Elements of a strict liability claim differ from 
elements of other tort clai~s, such as nuisance, negligence, or tres-
pass, in that defenses (such as absence of civil intent) are not avail-
able.294 
The following sections include an analysis of whether Right to Farm 
statutes protect farmers from liability for land application of sewage 
sludge based on nuisance and abnormally dangerous activity chal-
lenges. An abnormally dangerous activity cause of action may be the 
foremost strategy in the plaintiff's fight against the land application 
of sewage sludge. Although common law strict liability varies by 
jurisdiction, the criteria for determining whether sewage sludge ap-
plication may be an abnormally dangerous activity remain constant. 
This analysis focuses primarily on the abnormally dangerous activity 
doctrine under New Jersey common law. New Jersey law has been 
chosen as the focus of this analysis because: (1) a thorough examina-
tion of state common law on this point would be beyond the scope of 
this article; and (2) the New Jersey law of abnormally dangerous 
activities is comparatively well developed, in contrast to that of other 
states. One thing is certain in all jurisdictions: if sewage sludge appli-
cation is determined to be abnormally dangerous under the applicable 
common law, then strict liability may be imposed on farmers, contrac-
tors, and even POTWs who undertake such operations.295 This would 
in turn make land application a very risky venture. 
Before an analysis of Right to Farm protection can proceed, it is 
important to note that plaintiffs may be confronted with issues of 
sovereign immunity if they decide to bring a cause of action against 
POTWs. 
1. Issues of Sovereign Immunity 
POTWs may claim sovereign immunity against suits based on the 
common law causes of action discussed above. Public entities may be 
293 The rule seeks to internalize externalities. See id. at 556; see also Berg v. Reaction Motors, 
181 A.2d 487, 494 (N.J. 1962) (holding that action by property owners for compensatory and 
punitive damages to their property resulting from the testing of a rocket engine should in all 
fairness be absorbed by defendant as a cost of doing business). 
294 See generally Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982). 
290 Absolute liability for nuisance is recognized by New Jersey common law where defendant 
carnes on an abnormally dangerous activity in an inappropriate place or where the enterprise 
involves so great a risk to its surroundings that its location may be considered unreasonable. 
See New Jersey 'l'ransp. Dep't. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 419 A.2d 1151, 1161 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div.1980). 
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held liable only as permitted by their jurisdiction's Tort Claims Act. 
While there has been a steady and growing movement away from 
sovereign immunity, the general rule, which is still applied throughout 
the majority of states, is that immunity exists in tort actions against 
the state and substate governmental entities such as POTWs.296 In 
their respective Tort Claims Acts, all of the states have given limited 
consent to be sued in certain situations, however.297 For example, in 
New Jersey, POTWs are immune from claims unless a specific provi-
sion in the Tort Claims Act provides for the imposition of liability.298 
Thus, in New Jersey, broad discretionary immunities have been given 
to uniquely governmental functions, and public entities are not liable 
for injuries resulting from the exercise of their discretion.299 The rea-
soning behind this immunity is that high-level decisions calling for the 
exercise of official judgment or discretion must not be subject to the 
threat of tort liability.300 However, ministerial decisions, such as the 
selection of independent contractors, are not protected. In Kenney v. 
Scientific, Inc., residents claimed that personal injury and property 
damage was caused by the operation of local landfills which accepted 
hazardous waste.301 With regard to the public waste generators, the 
court found that they could not be held strictly liable because of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine.302 However, the court also held that the 
public waste generators could be liable for negligence in connection 
with the selection of an independent contractor to haul waste, if a 
low-level ministerial decision was involved in that selection.303 Thus, 
sovereign immunity will not protect a POTW that hires negligent in-
dependent sewage sludge contractors, unless that decision was made 
at a high level (which is unlikely). Even so, the doctrine probably 
would protect a POTW if there is no evidence of negligence and the 
court decides that land application of sewage sludge is a discretionary 
disposal decision. 
296 See Report of the Attorney General's 'lhsk Force on Sovereign Immunity (May 1972), 
reprinted in HARRY MARGOLIS & ROBERT NOVACK, CLAIMS AGAINST PUBLIC ENTITIES app. 
D (1994). 
297 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, Michigan, 
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Vermont, Washington and New York have abolished 
their immunity over the past ten years. See id. 
298 See New Jersey 'Ibrt Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1, 12-3 (West 1992). 
299 See id. § 59:2-3(a). 
300 See generally WILLIAM DREIER ET AL., NEW JERSEY PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND ToXIC 
ToRTS LAW ch. 34:2 (1998). 
801 497 A.2d 1310, 1313 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) 
300 See id. at 1325-26. 
80a See id. at 1326. 
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Where liability of a public entity is based on negligence, the entity 
must be found to be "palpably unreasonable" before liability can at-
tach.3M Thus, in Kenney, with regard to the landfill owned and oper-
ated by the township, the court held that the strict liability theory 
could not be applied because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.806 
The court also found, however, that the township might be liable for 
a dangerous condition created on the property, but only if it could be 
shown that the township acted in a "palpably unreasonable" fashion 
in its operation of the landfill.80o This higher standard of negligence 
provides some limited protection for public entities, because it is 
difficult to define what is palpably unreasonable in the context of 
discretionary activities. 
Before protection is provided, a POTW must actually prove that it 
engaged in discretionary activity of the type immunized by Tort 
Claims Acts. In Birchwood Lakes Colony Club v. Medford Lakes, 
residents sued a borough for compensatory damages arising from 
contamination of a private lake by nontoxic effluent from the bor-
ough's sewage treatment plant.807 The court held that the defendant 
had to show that the discharge of pollutants was a discretionary 
activity protected under the Tort Claims Act. If no showing of discre-
tionary conduct is made, protection is not warranted.80B 
The New Jersey Tort Claims Act also immunizes a POTW if it 
actively plans or designs, with the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection or other regulatory authorities, the activity that 
is responsible for the pollution.80g Thus, if a POTW constructs its 
sewage sludge treatment facility in cooperation with state regulatory 
authorities, it appears that the entity would not be liable for any 
pollution caused by such a facility. However, it is unclear whether this 
immunity would extend to pollution caused by the land application of 
products from such a facility. 
An exhaustive discussion of sovereign immunity is impracticable 
for the purposes of this article, especially since the doctrine varies by 
jurisdiction. Any cause of action against a POTW, however, will likely 
raise immunity issues. Thus, sovereign immunity is just one of many 
304 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2. 
305 See Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1317. 
306 See id. at 1318. 
3trl449 A.2d 472, 474-75 (N.J. 1982). 
308 See id. at 478-79. 
309 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6. 
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legal obstacles that potential plaintiffs must consider. Right to Farm 
protection for farmers is another issue which may preclude suits. 
2. Can Right to Farm Statutes Protect Farmers from Nuisance 
Liability? 
Most states have eliminated nuisance as a cause of action for adja-
cent landowners by enacting Right to Farm Acts. Right to Farm 
statutes typically define agricultural activity broadly to afford protec-
tion against nuisance actions for every conceivable agricultural opera-
tion (including sewage sludge application).31o For example, Michigan 
law defines "farm operation" in terms of all the potentially undesirable 
activities it encompasses: "noise; odors; dust; fumes; operation of ma-
chinery and irrigation pumps; ground and arial seeding; the applica-
tion of chemical fertilizers; conditioners, pesticide insecticides and 
herbicides .... "311 A few states avoid such broad definitions; for ex-
ample, Tennessee limits protection to feedlots, dairy farms, and egg 
production houses, and the Connecticut Act only provides protection 
for certain agricultural nuisances, such as odors from livestock or fer-
tilizer (sewage sludge).312 When farming activities change over time, 
however, it becomes less clear if protection is extended.313 For in-
stance, the North Carolina Right to Farm Act does not protect farms 
that have substantially changed in character. In Durham v. Britt, a 
North Carolina court of appeals held that it did "not believe the 
legislature intended [the act] ... to cover situations in which a party 
fundamentally changes the nature of the agricultural activity which 
had theretofore been covered under the statute."314 The court went 
on to suggest that a fundamental change could consist of a change in 
operation (such as a switch from diary to hog farming), but mentioned 
nothing about changes in agricultural practices, such as using sewage 
sludge. The New Mexico Right to Farm Statute does not apply when 
there is a change in operation that would create a nuisance,316 and in 
Utah, protection is not provided for agricultural operations that in-
crease or intensify a nuisance outside of protected agricultural ar-
310 See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 178, at 125. 
311 MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 286.472(2) (1998). 
312 See CONN. STAT. ANN. § 19a--341 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-18-101 (1993). 
313 Protection is normally extended only to well established agricultural activities. See Gross-
man & Fischer, supra note 178, at 125-27. 
314 451 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. App. 1994) (emphasis omitted). 
316 See Right to Farm Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-9-3A (Michie Supp. 1997). 
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eas.3l6 These statutes suggest that a farmer's adoption of sewage 
sludge application may not be covered under the relevant Right to 
Farm Act. However, the courts generally interpret these statutes in 
light of typical agricultural practices.3l7 Thus, land application of sew-
age sludge would most likely be covered, since beneficial reuse has 
become more of a norm for agricultural operations.3lB Moreover, land 
application of sewage sludge gives an economic benefit to farmers, in 
turn enabling them to be more competitive in a farm economy increas-
ingly less supported by federal subsidies. 
Right to Farm Acts work to insulate farmers from nuisance liability 
by codifying coming to the nuisance defenses, but at the same time 
they often attempt to afford environmental protection to neighboring 
landowners. Because adjacent landowners' health and safety are most 
often protected by specific environmental laws and regulations, the 
relationship between these laws and Right to Farm Acts is a sig-
nificant one. Right to Farm Acts may deprive neighbors of the ability 
to challenge agricultural operations by means of nuisance suits; nev-
ertheless, the various Right to Farm Acts around the country do try 
to incorporate goals of environmental protection by relying on three 
different statutory structures. 
The first group of acts condition Right to Farm protection on com-
pliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations. These 
statutes proclaim that noncompliance will subject farmers to enforce-
ment actions and nuisance liability.3l9 For example, in Kansas, an 
agricultural activity is not a nuisance if it is consistent with good 
agricultural practices (defined as being in conformity with federal, 
state, and 10callaws).32o Vermont's Right to Farm Law also provides 
protection for agricultural activities that conform to federal, state, 
and local regulations, and are thus deemed "good" agricultural prac-
tices.321 
316 See UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 78-38-7 (Michie 1998). 
317 See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 178, at 125-27. 
318 To exclude operations that modify technology in order to incorporate more efficient farming 
methods would counteract the policy of protecting properly operated (Le., in compliance with 
Part 503) farming activities: "the law should not hamper agricultural production." Id. at 129 
n.l44 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 823.08(1)). 
319 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-111, 3-112 (1998); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 3, § 140 (1998) 
("The provisions of this section shall not apply ... when such operation is being operated in 
violation of State or Federal law or any local or county ordinance."); see also N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 432:34 (1998) ("Agricultural operations shall not be found to be negligent or improper 
when they conform to federal, state and local laws."). 
320 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2302 (1998). 
321 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5753 (1997). 
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It seems that because most sewage sludge application operations 
are carried out in conformity with the Part 503 Rule, such operations 
would be protected under these statutory schemes. However, in Ver-
mont, the presumption that an activity is a good agricultural practice 
if in conformity with regulations is rebuttable with a showing that the 
activity is substantially adverse to public health and safety.322 The 
language in the Vermont Right to Farm Act enhances protection for 
neighboring landowners from odors caused by sewage sludge appli-
cation.323 State regulations prohibit air pollution. In these regulations, 
"air contaminant" includes odorous substances.324 The regulations for-
bid discharging "air contaminants" that cause a nuisance, and spe-
cifically forbid discharge of any objectionable odors beyond the prop-
erty line.325 Thus, because the Right to Farm Act provides that 
farmers must comply with state regulations, and because so many 
nuisance suits involve noxious odors, a severe limitation is placed on 
the ef-ficacy of the Right to Farm Act to protect farmers who choose 
to land-apply sewage sludge.326 
The second group of Right to Farm laws focuses on maintaining 
public health and safety as a method of environmental protection, 
rather than on compliance with environmental regulations.327 For ex-
ample, the Florida and New York Right to Farm Acts do not apply 
when a nuisance threatens public health and safety.328 New Jersey's 
Right to Farm Act also does not provide protection for nuisances that 
pose a direct threat to public health and safety.329 
Lastly, the third approach taken by Right to Farm Acts to provide 
protection for adjacent landowners is to allow the retention of reme-
dies for personal injury when negligent farming operations result in 
pollution. These statutes,330 based on the North Carolina Right to 
322 See id. Unfortunately, in light of the ongoing controversy surrounding sewage sludge 
application, it is unclear whether land application under the Part 503 Regulations is adverse to 
public health and safety. 
323 See id. 
324 VT. ENV. HEALTH & SAFETY REG. 5-241 (1995). 
325 See id. 
326 See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 178, at 145. 
327 See id. at 145--46. 
328 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14(4) (West 1998); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1300-c (1997). 
329 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1C-26 (West 1998) (which combines a focus on public health and 
safety with requirements that activities be in conformity with federal, state, and local laws). 
330 For example, Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, and North Dakota have all enacted 
this type of Right to Farm statute. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (1998); ILL. COMPo STAT. § 7014 
(1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3606 (West 1998); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 42-04-03 (Michie 1997). 
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Farm Act, expressly state that their intention is not to limit the right 
of a person to "recover damages for any injuries or damages sustained 
by them on account of any pollution of, or change in condition of, the 
waters of any stream or on account of any overflow of lands."331 Con-
sequently, these states do not provide nuisance protection for activi-
ties that may cause water pollution, and they allow private nuisance 
actions relating to water pollution or flooding.332 
Some Right to Farm laws also protect farmers from lawsuits based 
on causes of action other than nuisance. Numerous states have also 
explicitly prohibited causes of action for negligent activity on the part 
of farmers.333 Thus, farmers can be protected from liability based on 
an interference with the use and enjoyment of another's land, whether 
the cause of interference is an unreasonable intentional action or 
an unintentional but negligent one.334 For example, the piling up of 
manure, which subsequently contaminates a neighbor's well and is 
clearly negligent, would be protected under these statutes.335 
The exclusion of nuisance and negligence claims does not leave 
adjacent landowners without remedy, however. The above example of 
well pollution may constitute a continuing trespass, because it is a 
physical invasion by tangible matter. It is important to note that the 
model Right to Farm Acts, discussed above, do not provide protection 
against trespass actions by adjacent landowners. 
Adjacent landowners may wish to facially challenge Right to Farm 
legislative protections. In the recent case of Bormann v. Board of 
Supervisors In and For Kossuth County, the Iowa Supreme Court 
held that Iowa's Right to Farm Act, which provides nuisance immu-
nity to agricultural operations, was unconstitutional and invalid be-
cause it created a taking without just compensation.336 Where this 
leaves state nuisance protection for farmers is unclear. The court in 
331 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(c) (1992). 
332 The North Carolina law provides the right to recover damages, but does not mention 
injunctive relief. Thus, one interpretation, in terms of nuisance law, may be that a farmer could 
continue to cause a nuisance as long as he compensates his victims. See Grossman & Fischer, 
supra note 178, at 146 n.220. 
333 See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-52-4(g) (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. § 413.072 (Michie 1996); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5--403 (1998). 
334 But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (West 1997) (stating that protection does not apply 
if nuisance results from negligent farm operations). 
335 This hypothetical mirrors the factual scenario in Van Brocklin v. Gudema, 199 N.E.2d 457, 
459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964), which was decided before the state enacted Right to Farm protection. 
336 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998), cert denied 119 S. Ct. 1096 (1999) (passing on the constitution-
ality of IOWA CODE § 352.11(1)(a». 
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Bormann held that the County Board of Supervisors' approval of a 
landowner's application for an agricultural area337 triggered the immu-
nity provision in the state's Right to Farm Act and resulted in con-
demnation by nuisance of neighbors' properties without just compen-
sation.33s The court held that the immunity resulted in the Board's 
taking of an easement in the neighbors' properties for the benefit of 
the applicant, by entitling the applicant to perform activities on its 
property that would constitute a nuisance, were it not for the ease-
ment.SS9 The court thus held that the legislature exceeded its author-
ity by authorizing the use of property in such a way as to infringe on 
the rights of others by allowing the creation of a nuisance without just 
compensation. 
Compare this ruling to Judge Jasen's dissent in Boomer et al. v. 
Atlantic Cement Co., in which he stated that the permanent impair-
ment of private property for private purposes is not authorized in the 
absence of clearly demonstrated public benefit and use.340 According 
to Judge Jasen, private condemnation in the form of permanent dam-
ages should only be permitted when the public is served by the taking 
of the property.341 The Boomer dissent concluded that the promotion 
of the polluting cement company's interests had no public use or 
benefit.342 Did the Bormann court say much the same thing about 
Iowa's Right to Farm Statue? It can be argued that the easement 
created in Bormann did not solely benefit the applicant, but rather 
was a codification of the coming to the nuisance doctrine. The fact that 
it created an easement is not extraordinary. After all, many legislative 
enactments create easements. Perhaps what gave the court difficulty 
was the actual structure of Iowa's Right to Farm Act. Iowa's statute 
not only codified coming to the nuisance, but also provided protection 
to farming operations, regardless of when they were established or 
whether they had expanded.343 It is conceivable that the court was 
337 See id. The Board rejected the application for a pennit the first time, and approved by a 
coin toss the second time, and was thus held to be arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 311-12. 
The court could have stopped here, but in dictum, went on to address the constitutionality of 
the statute. See id. at 313. 
338 See id. at 316-22. 
339 See id. at 315-16. However, it is important to note that no such nuisance had yet occurred. 
340 257 N.E.2d 870, 875-77 (N.Y. 1970). 
341 See id. at 876. 
342 See id. at 876-77. 
343 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (West 1997) ("[AJ farm or farm operation located in an 
agricultural area shall not be found to be a nuisance regardless of the established date of 
operation or expansion of the agricultural activities of the fann or farm operation."). 
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worried about parcels being deemed agricultural after established 
residential communities had already been built. If this is true, then 
Bormann's precedential effect may be limited. 
If facial attacks on state Right to Farm statutes are limited to 
statutes providing very broad protection from nuisance actions, like 
Iowa's, then a preferable cause of action for adjacent landowners may 
be to challenge sewage sludge application operations as abnormally 
dangerous or "ultra hazardous" activities under the common law.344 
This is a possible means of circumventing Right to Farm protections, 
because Right to Farm laws provide no explicit immunity for activi-
ties deemed abnormally dangerous.345 The question is: could sewage 
sludge application to farmland be characterized as such an activity? 
3. Sewage Sludge Application as an Abnormally Dangerous 
Activity: Defeating Right to Farm Protections? 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth six factors in deter-
mining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous and thus subject 
to strict liability.346 
a) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the 
person, land or chattel of others; 
b) the likelihood that the harm that results will be great; 
c) the inability to eliminate the risks by the exercise of reasonable 
care; 
d) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common 
usage; 
e) the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is 
carried on; and 
f) the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed 
by its dangerous attributes.347 
Relying upon the Restatement definition, courts in New Jersey make 
a factual determination as to the abnormally dangerous character of 
an activity on a case by case basis.348 In determining whether the 
danger is abnormal, the factors listed above are all to be considered, 
and are all of importance. Because of the highly factual nature of the 
344 See generally PLATER ET AL., supra note 157. 
345 Of course, states may amend their Right to Farm Statutes to include immunity from suits 
based upon abnormally dangerous activity. 
346 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 519, 520 (1976). 
347Id. § 520. 
348 See T & E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1259 (N.T. 1991) (upholding the imposition of strict liability 
in New Jersey). 
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inquiry, it is impossible to reduce abnormally dangerous activities to 
a single definition.349 But one maxim controls throughout the caselaw: 
those who poison the land must pay for its cure.350 
It cannot be predicted with certainty whether courts will hold land 
application of sewage sludge to be an abnormally dangerous activity. 
As articulated by the Supreme Court of Washington: 
In determining whether the danger is abnormal the factors listed 
in Clauses (a) to (0 of [Restatement Section 520] are all to be 
considered and all are of importance .... The essential question 
is whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its 
magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to 
justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm which results 
from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable care.35! 
It is at least arguable that a court might consider sewage sludge 
application to be an abnormally dangerous activity. The risk of nega-
tively influencing the property values of neighboring landowners is 
high. Moreover, although government agencies are recommending the 
land application of sewage sludge in compliance with Part 503, a 
substantial body of credible scientific opinion has warned that the 
Part 503 regulations are insufficiently strict to protect public health.352 
If these authorities are correct, the resulting harm from land applica-
tion of sewage sludge may indeed be grave.353 In addition, if the Part 
503 regulations are too weak, compliance with them-which would 
constitute "reasonable care"-would still not eliminate the risk,354 
349 See id. 
360 See, e.g., T & E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1255; State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 
468 A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 1983); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chern. Corp., 181 A.2d 487, 
494 (N.J. 1962). 
361 Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 220 (Wash. 1977) (holding crop dusting to be an 
abnormally dangerous activity). 
362 This body of scientific opinion alone may be enough to render land application of sewage 
sludge an abnormally dangerous activity, because the cause of action for abnormally dangerous 
activity does not require a risk to public health from a ''toxic'' pollutant. In Langan, pesticides 
were legally sprayed on cropland from a helicopter, but an unpredictable gust of wind caused 
the substances to drift onto plaintiffs farmland. See id. Plaintiffs were organic farmers, and the 
contamination of their land consisted of the deposit of pesticide residues on their crops, even 
though these residues were below the tolerances set by U.s. Department of Agriculture. See 
id. Subsequently, plaintiffs destroyed the contaminated crop. See id. 
363 The potential "toxicity" of sewage sludge is a function of its land application rates over 
time. Courts have imposed liability for abnormally dangerous activities on land applications of 
substances that cumulatively cause damage at a later date. See, e.g., Branch, 657 P.2d 267 
(defendant's continuous depositing of wastewater from oil drilling in gravel pit on its own land, 
which reached plaintiffs well over a year later, was held to be an abnormally dangerous activity). 
364 Compliance with a permit is not a defense to a common law action for pollution damages. 
See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 173. 
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Also supporting an argument that land application is abnormally 
dangerous is the fact that it is not yet viewed as a common use of 
sewage sludge. This is because of the negative perceptions of this 
activity by the general public. Whether land application is inappro-
priate may also depend on public perceptions, as well as on whether 
the land application is widespread in the particular area. Finally, with 
regard to the value of land application of sewage sludge to the com-
munity, courts may find that the consequent risks to public health and 
property value outweigh the ecological and economic benefits. 
A court's characterization of a particular activity as "abnormally 
dangerous" is, in effect, a policy decision that one who conducts an 
extraordinarily unusual activity with potentially dangerous effects 
should be strictly liable for any damage that occurs.355 It would cer-
tainly not be frivolous to allege that land application of sewage sludge 
is such an activity. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State Department of Environ-
mental Protection v. Ventron Corp., stated that the handling of toxic 
waste such as mercury is an abnormally dangerous activity and that 
a "landowner is strictly liable to others for harm caused by toxic 
wastes that are stored on his property and flow onto the property of 
others, ... [even if the] one disposing of toxic waste may be perform-
ing an activity that is of some use to society."356 This rule has been 
extended to the handling of substances containing toxic wastes, even 
if a defendant had no knowledge that the substance contained such 
wastes.357 Thus, lack of knowledge was not an available defense under 
the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine. However, the so-called 
"state of the art" defense, that the risk of the activity was scien-
tifically unknowable at the time, seemed more appealing to the court 
in T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light COrp.35S The court noted that 
the availability of this defense to strict liability claims for abnormally 
dangerous activities posed an interesting question, but ultimately 
refused to resolve the issue.359 The court noted that requirements such 
as knowledge and foreseeability smack of negligence, and may be 
inappropriate in the realm of strict liability.360 However, the court 
355 See generally id. 157-232. 
356 468 A.2d at 157, 160; see also T & E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1261 (holding that the processing, 
handling, and storage of radium constituted an abnormally dangerous activity). 
357 See Prospect Indus. Corp. v. Singer Co., 569 A.2d 908, 911 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989). 
358 587 A.2d at 1259-60. 
369 See id. at 1260. 
360 See id. 
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went on to hold that the defendant, who processed, handled, and 
disposed of radium, should have known about the risks of its activ-
ity, and this constructive knowledge was enough to satisfy any such 
knowledge requirement.36l 
In addition to a common law basis for the imposition of strict liabil-
ity regarding abnormally dangerous activities, New Jersey state stat-
utes and federal laws also impose liability without fault for such 
acts.362 However, these statutes explicitly exclude sewage and sewage 
sludge from coverage. For example, the New Jersey "Spill Act," 
which is modeled after the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), states that "sewage and 
sewage sludge shall not be considered as hazardous substances for the 
purpose of this act."363 Does this mean that sewage sludge land appli-
cation can never be considered an abnormally dangerous activity 
under common law? The answer is probably "no," because statutory 
regulatory standards are not absolute defenses in common law ac-
tions.364 The New Jersey "Spill Act" expressly provides that its reme-
dies are in addition to common law remedies; thus common law char-
acterizations of abnormally dangerous activity remain valid.365 
As described above, it is arguable that sewage sludge is a poten-
tially toxic substance that may be abnormally dangerous. If the Part 
503 permit incorporates the standard of reasonable care, then it may 
not be sufficiently protective. Currently, the Part 503 regulations 
contain no standards or testing requirements for organic chemicals.366 
PCBs are an example of a class of organic contaminants generally 
found at low levels, but which can be concentrated at high levels in 
some sewage sludges.367 PCBs are not regulated under Part 503 be-
cause they are no longer manufactured in the United States. But 
existing PCBs, like dioxins and many other chlorinated synthetic 
organic chemicals, are persistent, slow to degrade, and can bioaccu-
361 See id. Radiation at the site exceeded those levels permitted under government health 
regulations, and the property was designated as a Superfund site. See id. 
362 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601 (1994); Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:lOA-1, :23.11(g) (West 
1998). 
363 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11(b), (k). 
364 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 173. 
365 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58.10-23.11(b), (k). 
366 However, it is rumored that EPA will establish numerical limits for dioxins, furans, and 
PCBs. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
367 See HARRISON ET AL., supra note 133, at 24-25. 
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mulate.368 Although the Ventron case dealt with acutely hazardous 
materials, unlike sewage sludge, dicta in Ventron might indicate that 
excessive cumulative loadings in sewage sludge might be considered 
abnormally dangerous: "the waste dumped may react synergistically 
with elements in the environment, or other waste elements, to form 
an even more toxic compound."369 Thus, if these organic chemicals can 
be shown to have negative, synergistic effects, a court in a particular 
case may hold that sewage sludge application is an abnormally dan-
gerous activity.370 
If this line of reasoning is followed, and sewage sludge application 
is deemed an abnormally dangerous activity, Right to Farm Laws 
could not be relied upon to protect farmers from private tort actions.371 
The abnormally dangerous activity doctrine imposes strict, joint and 
several liability upon all actors.372 Generators, contractors, and farm-
ers might all be held jointly and severally liable for any damages. Joint 
and several liability, imported by CERCLA from the common law, 
shifts the liability to any identifiable party that participated in the 
activity.373 There is no apportionment of harm, and defendants are left 
to sue other responsible parties for contribution. Given the limited 
ability of municipalities and most farmers to pay large sums of money 
in damages, this liability scheme would have a chilling effect on land 
application of sewage sludge.374 
Under such a liability scheme, it seems that indirect dischargers 
would be considered part of the disposal chain and thus could be held 
strictly liable. The question then becomes: how far down the chain of 
causation can liability extend? The obvious defense raised by indirect 
dischargers would be that losses were not foreseeable and thus too 
368 More than 50% of dioxins and furans were still present in soils 20 years after sewage sludge 
application. See Michael S. McLachlan et al., Polychlorinated Dibenzo-P-dioxins and Dibenzo-
furans in Sewage Sludge: Sources and Fate Following Sludge Application to Land, 185 SCI. OF 
THE 'lbTAL ENV'T 109, 118 (1996). 
369 468 A.2d 150, 159 (N.J. 1983). 
370 See HARRISON ET AL., supra note 133, at 34. (explaining possible synergistic effects). 
371 This would be the case unless state courts hold that even though abnormally dangerous 
activities are not explicitly included in Right to Farm Statutes, they are nevertheless implicitly 
immunized from liability by them. But such an interpretation would violate the indusio unius 
principle of statutory construction: that whatever is not specifically mentioned is presumed to 
be excluded. 
372 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 196. 
373 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
374 Although under CERCLA, EPA has limited its efforts to recovering a "fair" share from 
municipalities when other parties are involved. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 811. 
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remote for them to be held liable.375 However, given EPA's preference 
for beneficial reuse of sewage sludge, it could be argued that those 
indirect dischargers could have reasonably foreseen that the sewage 
sludge from their discharges would be applied to agricultural land. 
This is only one example of how complicated and unpredictable liabil-
ity might become in such cases. The Conclusions and Recommenda-
tion section of this article discusses how the establishment of a com-
pensation fund as a risk-sharing mechanism might clarify questions 
regarding liability. 
It is also possible that courts will not extend the doctrine of abnor-
mally dangerous activities to sewage sludge land application. If a 
court decides that knowledge is a requirement under the abnormally 
dangerous activity doctrine, it may then decide that farmers who 
place their trust in compliance with Part 503 should be immunized. 
Given the scientific controversy and uncertainty surrounding sludge 
application, it is unlikely that any farmer could have constructive 
knowledge as to the dangers of sludge. In T&E Industries, the dan-
gers of radium were well documented, and the owner of the site knew 
that it had been given Superfund designation.376 
Even if the court decides that knowledge is not a prerequisite for 
a strict liability claim for an abnormally dangerous activity (as the 
court seemed to do in T&E Industries), it still may not extend the 
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to sewage sludge disposal for 
public policy reasons-the chain of liability might be too extensive. 
Farmers,377 contractors/transporters/applicators,378 as well as indirect 
dischargers and POTWs, may be liable because the liability for abnor-
mally dangerous waste is absolute from the moment the waste is 
generated until the waste produces harm.379 Without workable risk-
376 See generally Pruit v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (holding that 
commercial fisherman can recover against a chemical company for its pollution of the 
Chesapeake Bay, but plaintiffs who purchased and marketed seafood could not recover because 
their damages were insufficiently direct to be legally cognizable). 
376 See 587 A.2d 1249, 1253-54 (N.J. 1991). 
377 Where work to be done is ''ultra hazardous," there is absolute liability on the part of the 
person engaging the services of the independent contractor, regardless of fault. See Majestic 
Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 153 A.2d 321, 324, 326 (N.J. 1959). 
378 If there is liability for the hauler/transporter, it is only for the period that the hauler/trans-
porter possesses the waste. See Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1327 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1985). 
379 "[A] company [municipality] which creates the Frankenstein monster of abnormally dan-
gerous waste should not expect to be relieved of accountability for the depredations of its 
creature, merely because the company entrusts the monster's care to another, even an inde-
pendent contractor." [d. at 1320. 
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sharing mechanisms for dealing with widespread liabilities, an exten-
sion of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to land application 
of sewage sludge might Ultimately discourage this mode of disposa1,380 
4. Sewage Sludge and Product Liability: A Combination of 
Common Law Theories and Statutory Strict Liability 
Once the Part 503 EQ sewage sludge criteria are met, sewage 
sludge-derived material can be deemed a sewage sludge product, 
which can be registered with the Department of Agriculture just like 
any normal fertilizer or soil conditioner.381 Proponents of sludge-de-
rived products argue that their production will reduce a POTW's 
potential sludge management liability. When sludge is used to produce 
a product, title to the sludge might be passed from the POTW to the 
EQ product manufacturer, thus insulating a POTW from liability.382 
The sludge would be treated as any other raw material used in the 
production of a product. In such a situation, POTWs would arguably 
be relieved of responsibility for any future mismanagement of the 
sewage sludge.383 Proponents also argue that transferring sewage 
sludge to companies making EQ sewage sludge products would re-
lieve POTWs from a substantial amount of the Part 503 burden.384 For 
31ll Furthermore, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity is not limited to neighboring 
property owners, as the liability for harms caused by abnormally dangerous activity does not 
cease with the transfer of the property. Under New Jersey law, a landowner who conducts an 
abnormally dangerous activity on his property is also strictly liable to subsequent owners of 
that property for any harm caused by that activity. The doctrine of caveat emptor is not a 
defense. Landlords, under certain conditions, can also be held liable. Subsequent tenants, under 
the common law, have a cause of action for strict liability against the landlord for a prior tenant's 
environmental contamination of the property, even though the landlord did not himself pollute 
the site (especially if he actively administered the leasehold). Thus, the nature of farmland 
assessment as we know it may drastically change. See infra notes 488-90 and accompanying 
text. 
381 See Holgate Property Assocs. v. Township of Howell, 679 A.2d 613, 617-18 (N.J. 1996) 
(holding that the approval of a permit exemption for a sludge-derived product site by the 
Department of Environmental Protection did not require formal public notice procedures be-
cause sludge-derived products are essentially regulated as fertilizers). 
382 See supra notes 382-84 and accompanying text. 
383 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1354-55 (N.D. 
Ill. 1992) (holding that a corporation which sold fly ash for use in manufacturing road base is not 
liable for buyer's disposal of fly ash); Douglas County, Neb. v. Gould Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 
1244-48 (D. Neb. 1994) (bolding that seller of lead plates from spent batteries to company for 
use in smelting operations was not liable for contamination at smelting company's facility). 
384 See, e.g., Memorandum from Environmental Counsel at the Law Firm of Spengler Nathan-
son to N-Viro International Corporation, Municipal Sewage Sludge Management-Under-
standing, Minimizing and Avoiding Liability 15-16 (Sept. 1995) (on file with authors). 
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example, permit requirements would only contain conditions up to the 
time the POTW transfers the sludge. No Part 503 land application 
requirements would apply.385 Therefore, there would be less likelihood 
of Part 503 permit violations, on the part of the POTW, that could 
trigger potential CERCLA liability (as discussed below). Further-
more, the sale of the final EQ sewage sludge product to a third party 
might arguably insulate both the POTW and the product manufac-
turer from CERCLA liability as well. 
On the other hand, if sewage sludge is treated as a crop care 
product, the possibility arises that companies producing such a prod-
uct (which may be POTWs) will be open to product liability actions. 
Like companies that manufacture fertilizers, the manufacturers of 
sewage sludge-derived products may be held liable for personal injury 
or property damage allegedly caused by their products.385 
Generally, fertilizer product liability suits have been based on com-
mon law theories of negligence, breach of warranty (implied or ex-
press), strict liability in tort, or a combination thereof.387 A negligence 
theory of recovery focuses on the manufacturer's conduct, i.e., the 
manufacturer was allegedly at fault in creating the defect in the 
product and it knew, or should have known, about the defect and yet 
sent the product into the stream of commerce. Thus, in design or 
warning defect cases, the issue is the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer in marketing a product and in warning, or failing to warn, of the 
dangers associated with the use/misuse of that product.388 In strict 
liability cases, the focus is on the product itself, and the manufacturer 
is deemed to know about the harmful propensities of the product.389 
The implied warranty theory of recovery has typically been used 
where a product malfunctions or is simply unfit for use.390 This theory 
of recovery holds sellers liable to their immediate buyers, but is 
considered largely irrelevant in design or warning defect cases.391 
That a product was fit for its intended use has no bearing on whether 
386 In addition, the conversion of the sewage sludge could also decrease a POTW's potential 
exposure to natural resource damages. 
386 See generally Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Products Liability: Fertilizers, Insecticides, 
Pesticides, Fungicides, Weedkillers, and the Like, or Articles Used in Application Thereof, 12 
A.L.R.4th 462 (1982). 
387 See id. § 2[a]. 
388 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1997). 
389 See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 (1993). The emphasis in strict liability is on 
the safety of the product rather than the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. See id. 
390 See DREIER ET AL., sU'J1f"a note 300, at 1-3. 
391 See id. 
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or not the manufacturer should be held liable for injuries resulting 
from the design or failure to warn.392 Finally, the express warranty 
theory of recovery is largely statutory, and is governed by the Uni-
form Commercial Code.393 
Some states have superseded common law theories of recovery 
with Product Liability Acts.394 New Jersey's Product Liability Act 
(the Act) has the effect of creating a unified, statutorily defined theory 
of recovery that is, for the most part, identical to strict liability.395 
Under the Act, negligence and breach of warranty claims are no 
longer viable as separate claims for harm caused by defective prod-
uctS.396 If product liability actions against sewage sludge product man-
ufacturers are subject to the provisions of acts such as New Jersey's, 
then the safety of sludge-derived products themselves, and not nec-
essarily the manufacturer's conduct, would come under scrutiny and 
strict liability would be imposed. Once again, the scientific uncertainty 
surrounding the EQ criteria and criticism of EPA's beneficial reuse 
policy would likely playa role in litigation.397 However, the New 
Jersey Product Liability Act explicitly excludes from coverage envi-
ronmental torts actions.398 These actions are defined as civil actions 
"seeking damages for harm where the cause of the harm is exposure 
to toxic chemicals or substances .... "399 Harm means physical damage 
to property or personal or physical illness, pain and suffering, mental 
anguish, or any loss of consortium or services.400 Thus, if sewage 
sludge-derived products are deemed environmentally harmful, ac-
tions brought against manufacturers for damage to property and 
392 See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 827 (N.J. 1978). 
393 See DREIER ET AL., supra note 300, at 1-4. 
894 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-l (West 1998). Other states with similar acts include Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wash-
ington. 
890 See Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1316-17 (N.J. 1993). 
896 See Reiff v. Convergent Techs., 957 F. Supp. 573, 583 (D.N.J. 1997). 
397 It is likely however, that as long as a manufacturer meets Part 503 standards he would not 
be held liable under a strict liability theory. 
898 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-S. At one time, the exclusion was only intended to encompass 
actions involving the pollution of ambient air and of streams and other bodies of water, dumping 
of toxic wastes, and similar activities ordinarily regarded as environmental torts. See DREIER 
ET AL., supra note 300, at 8. This was rejected in favor of a broader reading of the statute to 
include occupational exposures within the definition. See id. (citing New Jersey Assembly 
Insurance Committee Statement to Senate, S. REP. No. 2805 (1987». 
899 Id. § 2A:58C-l. 
400 See id. 
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persons might be considered environmental torts, and thus might be 
excluded from coverage under the Act. 
Whether EQ products are harmful to crops and humans remains 
controversial. But, assuming that damage from sewage sludge prod-
uct application occurs, and it can be shown that the product was 
environmentally harmful, a product liability action would not be com-
pletely barred under the environmental tort exclusion of the Act. 
Instead, the action would be governed by that jurisdiction's common 
law theories. For example, in Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp., where an 
employee of a produce broker suffered injury from contact with a 
fungicide, his action against the manufacturer for inadequate warning 
was excluded from coverage under the Act because it involved an 
"environmental tort," but he was not foreclosed from bringing a com-
mon law failure to warn claim against the manufacturer.401 Thus, com-
mon law theories of recovery still play a role in shaping product 
liability actions against manufacturers of crop care products, even 
within a statutory context. 
Courts have reached different results as to whether a property 
owner may recover damages in a products liability action for injuries 
to his property caused by the application of fertilizers or similar 
products. Most theories of recovery in this area involve either express 
or implied warranties of quality given by the seller or manufacturer. 
Naturally, if a sewage sludge product does not meet Part 503 stand-
ards, is marketed as EQ, and then it causes injury, the manufacturer 
would have breached its duty to consumers.402 But more interesting 
to consider is what happens if sewage sludge that meets EQ standards 
causes injury? As is often the case, crop damage and causation issues 
will become an issue of expert testimony and scientific evidence.403 
Courts have sometimes allowed recovery for personal injuries caused 
401 630 A.2d 805, 807, 808 n.1, 808-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
4"" See Patterson v. Orangeburg Fertilizer Co., 108 S.E. 401, 405 (S.C. 1921) (manufacturer of 
fertilizer erroneously marketed as free from deleterious elements violated its implied warranty). 
403 See, e.g., Braly v. Midvalley Chern. Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 369 (1961). In Braly, the plaintiff 
introduced evidence and expert testimony that his cotton crop was damaged by fertilizer burn, 
while the defendant introduced expert testimony that crop damage was due not to fertilizer 
burn, but instead to a fungus disease. The court affirmed a judgment in favor of the defendants, 
stating that although the evidence could have supported a verdict to the contrary, the court was 
without power to find that there was no substantial evidence which would support the conclusion 
by the jury. See id. at 376. In Stone's Farm Supply, the court held that the plaintiff farmer 
presented sufficient scientific evidence that fertilizer, which allegedly damaged potato crop, 
contained harmful phenoxy-herbicide. 
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by fertilizers and similar products,404 while in other cases they have 
concluded that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish 
liability.405 Courts have also found crop care product manufacturers 
liable for injury to livestock.406 
In New Jersey, even though the Products Liability Act governs 
most theories of recovery, the legislative committee statements make 
it clear that warning defect cases are also still largely covered by the 
common law.407 Due to the fact that fertilizers and other chemical 
products for crop care can often be toxic to human beings and some 
plants, the common law has typically dictated that the manufacturer, 
distributor, or retail seller of crop care products has a duty to warn 
users of the product's foreseeable dangers that cannot reasonably 
be expected to be within the knowledge of users.408 Regardless of 
whether a failure to warn claim is premised upon a theory of negli-
gence, strict liability, or breach of warranty, the duty to warn arises 
only where the risk of harm is foreseeable to defendant.409 A risk of 
harm is foreseeable when a defendant has actual knowledge of the 
dangerous propensities of the product,41O Furthermore, the manufac-
turers of herbicides and insecticides have been subject to a duty to 
warn where they reasonably should have known of a risk of harm, for 
example, where the scientific evidence of a link between exposure and 
an illness or disease is less than conclusive, but where there is a 
general link between the chemical product and a specific category of 
illness.41l "Although a manufacturer may not have had actual or con-
structive knowledge of a danger so as to impose a duty to warn, 
subsequently acquired knowledge, both actual and constructive, may 
obligate the manufacturer to take reasonable steps to notify purchas-
ers and consumers of the newly-discovered danger."412 
401 See Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Hungerholt, 319 F.2d 352, 361 (8th Cir. 1963) (holding 
that a truck driver, who contacted extreme dermititis after fertilizer bag broke, could recover 
for personal injuries because skin contact was a foreseeable danger, even though fertilizer was 
not normally intended to be applied to human skin). 
4116 See Cone v. Virginia-Carolina Chern. Corp., 174 So. 554, 555 (Miss. 1937) (holding that 
plaintiff failed to prove that fertilizer was in fact dangerous, except to the extent that its 
dangerous condition was shown by proof of the injury). 
406 See generally Lehoczky v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 498 N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. App. 
Div.1986). 
407 See Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 131 N.J. 375, 384 (1993). 
408 See, e.g., John Norton Farms, Inc. v. Todagco, 124 Cal. App. 3d 149, 173 & n.9 (1981). 
409 See id. at 169, 173. 
410 See Melancon v. Western Auto Supply Co., 628 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1980). 
m See Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536--37 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
412 Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388--89 (N.J. 1984). 
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In order to comply with its common law duty to warn of any 
dangerous propensities, the manufacturer must furnish a warning on 
the label that is sufficient to convey to those who might use the 
product notice of any inherent dangers in the product and of the 
possible consequences of the use or even misuse thereof.413 A product 
may be manufactured and designed perfectly, but may still be defec-
tive under the common law if it contains a hidden danger. Products 
with such hidden dangers are defective unless they are accompanied 
by a warning that includes "the directions, communications and infor-
mation essential to make the use of the product safe."414 This might 
cause a problem for sewage sludge manufacturers relying solely on 
Part 503 requirements. Recall that for sewage sludge and sewage 
sludge derived products meeting the EQ standards, no labeling or 
user information is required.415 There has been a great deal of criticism 
regarding the lack of information given to consumers about sewage 
sludge product quality.416 However, what is now merely criticism could 
in the future form the basis of a lawsuit. The common law actions 
against fertilizer manufacturers described above suggest that sewage 
sludge product manufacturers relying on Part 503 compliance may 
also be open to common law property damage, personal injury, and 
failure to warn claims based on product liability. 417 
B. Statutory Liability 
1. CERCLA 
Common law strict liability has been extensively supplemented, or 
even supplanted, by strict liability imposed under the terms of envi-
ronmental statutes. At the federal level, the most significant source 
of potential strict, joint, and several liability is CERCLA.418 Under 
413 See John Norton Farms, 124 Cal. App. 3d at 173 n.10, 173-74. 
414 Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1981). 
415 However, sludge sold in bags that does not meet EQ metal limits must have a label 
indicating a maximum annual loading rate. See 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 9400-01 (1993). 
416 See HARRISON ET AL., supra note 133, at 5, 20-2l. 
417 Another aspect that might be explored is whether compliance with Part 503 will preempt 
state common law product liability actions, as does compliance with the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994); see also Papas v. Upjohn 
Co., 985 F.2d 516, 518 (1993). The language of Part 503 seems to suggest that its labeling 
requirement is a minimum requirement. 
418 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 252-53, 882-918. 
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CERCLA, generators, transporters, and disposers of hazardous sub-
stances, including those who arrange for the disposal of hazardous 
substances, such as POTW operators, are strictly, jointly, and sever-
ally liable for the costs of cleanup relating to releases or threatened 
releases of such substances.419 
At first glance, it appears that Congress and EPA have provided 
safe harbors in CERCLA directly applicable to the land application 
of sewage sludge. First, section 101(22) of CERCLA specifically de-
fines "release" to exclude the "normal application of fertilizer."420 Sec-
ond, a party is also protected when a release of a hazardous substance 
is federally authorized, such as pursuant to a CWA permit.421 Lastly, 
in the preamble to the Part 503 Rule, EPA states that if the placement 
of the sewage sludge on land is considered to be either (1) the normal 
application of fertilizer under CERCLA, or (2) a "federally permitted 
release," then CERCLA liability would not result.422 However, CER-
CLA's fertilizer and federally permitted release exemptions, and 
EPA's brief discussion about the exemptions' applicability to sewage 
sludge land application, raise as many questions as they answer.423 
Superficially, it appears that the land application of sewage sludge 
falls under the fertilizer exemption to CERCLA. In addition, to the 
extent that sewage sludge is applied in a normal manner and within 
normal concentrations, that is, if land application is a "federally per-
mitted release," that placement would not constitute a "release" that 
would give rise to CERCLA liability.424 A release in compliance with 
a sewage sludge permit issued by EPA (or an EPA-authorized state) 
would thus qualify as a "federally permitted release."425 However, if 
any of the requirements contained in a Part 503 permit were violated, 
it would appear that an associated release would not be a "federally 
permitted release," and CERCLA liability would accrue. In Fal-
low.field Development Corp. v. Strunk, the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Resources issued a permit to defendant Strunk, 
allowing him to land-apply sewage sludge as fertilizer to cornfields.426 
419 See 42 u.s.c. § 9607. 
420 Id. § 9601(22). 
421 See 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 9262 (1993). 
422 See id. 
423 See LUE-HING ET AL., su'P"a note 76, at 16-21. 
424 See id. at 21. 
426 Most National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits are likely to be 
issued to POTWs, but those actors linked to them by contract would probably also be covered 
by this federally permitted release exclusion. 
426 See No. 89-8644, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12,758, at *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1994). 
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Unfortunately, the sewage sludge contained lead, trichloroethane, 
trichloroethylene, chloroform, and other hazardous substances, pre-
sumably in violation of the permit.427 Ultimately, the site was included 
on EPA's National Priority List and the purchasers of the property 
sued Strunk under several theories, including CERCLA.428 The court 
summarily rejected Strunk's argument that his application of sewage 
sludge was a protected release under CERCLA, holding that "uncon-
tradicted evidence support a finding that the sludge applied by the 
Strunk's [sic] was not 'normal' because it was contaminated. Accord-
ingly, the exemption for normal application of fertilizer is inapplica-
ble."429 
If sewage sludge is applied in violation of a permit, a farmer could 
be liable under CERCLA. Moreover, a POTW's CERCLA fate may 
be entirely out of its control, and may depend on the ability of its 
contractors and/or farmers and state enforcement officials to ensure 
that 100% compliance is maintained. If a POTW's sewage sludge 
contractors disregard accepted management practices, then CER-
CLA liability may rest with the POTW. 
Furthermore, neither CERCLA's language nor its legislative his-
tory indicates whether the exclusion of the initial application of a 
fertilizer (first release) extends to any later contamination of ground-
water caused by chemicals in the sewage sludge.430 Thus, despite 
EPA's assertions to the contrary, CERCLA liability may exist in 
certain circumstances. For farmers, however, CERCLA liability may 
actually be comparatively beneficial. The CERCLA exemption does 
not protect them from state cleanup responsibility because the ex-
emption does not appear to preempt state law, such as State Spill 
Fund cleanup requirements.431 Accordingly, if farmers are subject to 
state cleanup laws, which are often stricter than federal require-
ments, they may not be able to bring in other responsible parties to 
contribute to cleanup costs. However, if CERCLA's joint and several 
liability scheme controls the cleanup, the statute may provide flexibil-
ity to allow farmers to join other potentially responsible parties. 
427 See id. at *3 (noting that other hazardous chemicals were separately dumped on the 
property). 
428 See id. at *9. 
429 I d. at *70. 
430 See LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 16. 
431 See 42 U.S.C. § 9614. 
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2. RCRA 
CERCLA is not the only federal statute that may impose liability 
upon farmers for the land application of sewage sludge. RCRA also 
governs disposal of "solid waste."432 Section 1004(27) of RCRA defines 
"solid waste" as "garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment 
plant, water supply treatment plant ... and other discarded material 
.... "433 The use of the term "discarded material" has led to a long-
standing debate about whether secondary materials that are reused 
and recycled are "solid waste," and thus within the jurisdiction of 
RCRA.434 While EPA has sometimes vascillated about whether other 
recycled materials are solid waste under RCRA, it has been the 
agency's consistent opinion, since 1979, that sewage sludge used as 
fertilizer is a solid waste.435 
In 1985, EPA amended its hazardous waste regulations to more 
clearly define when secondary waste materials (sewage sludges) are 
considered to be solid wastes.436 EPA then explicitly took the position 
that all sewage sludges used in a manner constituting disposal (i.e. 
placed on the land) were solid waste, even if used as fertilizer.437 It is 
unlikely that sewage sludge used as fertilizer pursuant to section 405 
of the CWA would be listed as hazardous waste. However, under 
RCRA sections 7002 and 7003, as a nonhazardous solid waste, sewage 
sludge may still be subject to corrective action requirements if dis-
posed of at a facility requiring a RCRA Subtitle C Permit (which 
would not be the case for land application to cropland or rangeland, 
or abatement action).438 
Under the citizen suit provision of RCRA's section 7002, private 
RCRA cleanup actions might also be brought against sewage sludge 
applicators by plaintiffs seeking reimbursement of cleanup costS.439 
For years, it appeared that the citizen suit remedy provided by 
RCRA was limited to the abatement of the contamination, not reim-
bursement of cleanup costS.440 In KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, how-
432 Id. §§ 6901-6991k. 
433 I d. § 6903(27). 
434 See LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 18. 
435 See 44 Fed. Reg. 53,438, 53,449-55 (1979); see also LUE HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 18. 
436 See LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 18. 
437 See 44 Fed. Reg. at 53,449. 
438 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972, 6973; see also LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 19 (noting that 
the likelihood of health or environmental problems necessitating an abatement or corrective 
action, being caused by applications conforming to CWA Section 405 guidelines, is remote). 
439 See 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 
440 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 799. 
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ever, a private cost recovery action against fonner service station 
operators was successfully maintained by a party who had cleaned up 
a petroleum release on that parce1.441 Thus, it appeared that private 
parties could obtain more complete relief under RCRA section 7002 
then they could obtain under CERCLA. However, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that because plaintiffs had al-
ready cleaned up the site, no imminent and substantial endangerment 
existed so as to allow for recovery of cleanup costS.442 The Court stated 
that the RCRA citizen suit provision was not intended to provide 
compensation for past cleanup efforts.443 If an imminent and substan-
tial endangennent still exists, however, it seems that private parties 
may recover response costs for work taken thereafter. 
Furthennore, while sewage sludge may not be listed as hazardous 
waste under RCRA, it may be regulated as such if it exhibits RCRA 
toxicity characteristics or is derived from a listed waste.444 The do-
mestic sewage exemption in section 1004 of RCRA does not provide 
a defense against a potential RCRA suit based on the land application 
of sewage sludge-it has been a long-standing position of EPA that 
this "domestic sewage exemption" does not extend to residuals from 
the treatment of domestic sewage.446 
The potential for CERCLA and RCRA liability for sewage sludge 
reuse projects depends on two factors: (1) the likelihood of hann 
occurring that would lead to legal action; and (2) the existence of a 
legal basis to support such an action.446 The above discussion outlines 
possible statutory liability for flawed beneficial reuse projects, al-
though research has disclosed no CERCLA or RCRA legal actions in 
which plaintiffs have successfully recovered cleanup costs and natural 
resource damages resulting from land application projects.447 But as 
time passes and scientific knowledge increases, it is possible that even 
441 See 49 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 1995). 
442 See Meghrig v. KFC w., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 488 (1996). 
443 See id. at 487. 
444 See LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 18. 
445 See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,321-22 (1988); 44 Fed. Reg. at 53,449-55. 
446 See LUE-HING ET AL., supra note 76, at 16, 19. 
447 Federal statutory liability allows for the recovery of natural resource damages, which may 
include damages not only for the cost of restoring the environment to its pre-contamination 
condition, but also damages for the recovery of compensable "values." These values are the 
amount of money required to compensate the public for the loss of services provided by the 
injured resources between the time of the release and the time those resources are fully 
returned to their original state. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 
14,262, 14,286 (1994). 
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beneficial reuse projects performed in conformance with applicable 
regulations may result in contamination, thus subjecting them to 
federal statutory liability under CERCLA and RCRA. 
V. RISK-SHARING MECHANISMS 
In examining the legal problems associated with sewage sludge 
application, one fact has become clear: "liability ... is an orphan-no 
one wants it, nor could any private business or individual accept it 
and stay in business."448 It is therefore not surprising that Farm 
Credit Institutions, consisting of major farm lenders in the United 
States, have also raised concerns over the potential damage to farmer 
livelihood should properties be subjected to the potential liabilities 
discussed above.449 Naturally, lenders do not wish to be subject to joint 
and several liability, and wish to preserve land productivity and value. 
Under CERCLA, ownership alone triggers liability, even though the 
owner has not actually participated in generating or disposing of the 
substance.460 Lenders have been found liable for clean ups even if they 
did not acquire the property, but had the capacity to affect hazardous 
waste disposal decisions.4lil EPA has proposed a system of de minimus 
landowner settlements under CERCLA, and has exempted lenders 
from the definition of "owner-operator" if the lender does not partici-
pate in management and holds an "indicia of ownership primarily to 
protect [his] security interest .... "452 If, however, a lender becomes 
an owner by foreclosing and taking title to the property, or by con-
ducting management activities at the site, he is potentially liable.453 
Lenders are also wary of the other possible legal actions, discussed 
above, that may be brought against them or other parties involved. 
Thus, in order to explore the issues relating to liability arising from 
land application of sewage sludge, the Farm Credit Bank of Spring-
448 CHARLES M. BENBROOK & ROGER N. ALLBEE, MINIMIZING RISKS AND SHARING LIABIL-
ITY FROM ApPLICATION OF SLUDGE AND SLUDGE By-PRODUCTS ON AGRICULTURAL LANDS 10 
(1993) (Report from a Symposium on November 2!h30, 1993, sponsored by Springfield District 
Farm Credit Council) (on file with authors). 
448 See generally id. 
450 See Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 
1988). 
461 See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1990). 
462 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)(i). 
463 The lender is eligible for a de minimus settlement if he meets the requirements of CER-
CLA section 122, including demonstrating that he conducted all appropriate inquiry prior to 
acquisition of the property. See id. § 9622(g). 
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field, Massachusetts, invited a number of interested parties to a two-
day symposium, in November of 1993, on "Minimizing Risks and 
Sharing Liability from Application of Sludge and Sludge By-Products 
on Agricultural Land." The purpose of the symposium was to recom-
mend actions for minimizing any perceived or real risks attached to 
land application, and to focus on the task of developing equitable 
risk-sharing mechanisms within the joint and several liability frame-
work.464 One conclusion was certain-under current law, landowners, 
farm operators, and lenders are all potentially liable for risks arising 
from application of sewage sludge, unless one of them assumes such 
risks from the others through a clear, legally enforceable mechanism. 
A variety of management tools and risk-sharing mechanisms were 
explored at the Symposium. The following is a description of three of 
these-bonds, insurance, and express indemnification agreements. 
A. Bonds 
The posting of bonds could adequately cover certain clearly defined 
expenses, such as those associated with monitoring and management 
costS.465 However, bonds are less useful as a risk-sharing mechanism 
in instances where potential liability exposure is large. For instance, 
in cases where settlements would be costly or exposure to class action 
suits would be broad, the bond required would be prohibitively ex-
pensive.456 However, it is recognized that bonds could be a mechanism 
to assure an available pool of funds should landowners and operators 
fail to carry out best management practices, or should they no longer 
be willing to do so. 
B. Insurance 
For companies engaged in potentially risky activities, such as sew-
age sludge land application, insurance can be a necessary protection 
against a variety of claims. Any or all of the following parties could 
obtain insurance coverage: the POTW, the sewage sludge-derived 
454 At the same time, participants called for Congress and EPA to confirm that land applica-
tion, done in conformance with regulations, would not be subject to the CERCLA liability 
scheme. See Benbrook & Allbee, supra note 448, at 7. 
466 POTWs would have to post a general bond in favor of anyone injured or damaged, the state 
for clean up costs, and possibly even the federal government if CERCLA liability attaches. A 
secondary bond may be posted by "sludgers" and may be required under contract in case 
sludgers violate 503 standards. 
468 See Benbrook & Allbee, supra note 448, at 10-11. 
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product manufacturer, other transporters, the sewage sludge contrac-
tor responsible for applying the sludge to land (sludger), and the 
farmer-landowner. However, the environmental liability and associ-
ated risks faced by these actors will rarely, if ever, be fully covered 
by insurance.457 Some sewage sludge vendors have purchased policies 
offering limited protection,458 although it is unclear what risks are 
actually covered, what standards a court would apply in determining 
responsibility among parties, or what limits of protection these poli-
cies afford. The effectiveness of insurance as a risk-sharing mecha-
nism, and the cost of obtaining coverage, will depend upon the scope 
of the coverage provided, limitations on the number and size of claims, 
and the conditions that must be met in order to justify a claim.459 
The liability insurance policy that offers the broadest protections 
against third party suits is the "comprehensive general liability pol-
icy" (CGL).460 These policies are based on standard forms developed 
by the insurance industry and provide for two types of claims: those 
for bodily injury and those for property damage. However, these 
policies also contain a standard pollution exclusion, which is the 
most significant issue affecting coverage for suits involving sewage 
sludge application.461 A standard exclusion typically defines "pollut-
ants" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, 
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and 
waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or re-
claimed."462 The question is whether sludge is to be treated as a 
pollutant. In two related cases, Colorado courts have denied insurance 
company motions for summary judgment, and held that a question of 
fact existed as to whether treated sewage sludge was to be considered 
457 See id. at 8. 
468 For example, N -Viro International Corporation has obtained product liability insurance for 
N-Viro licensees who meet trademark specifications and EQ standards. Thtal coverage is $5 
million per occurrence, such as crop failure due to the application of N -Viro soil during the 
insured period. Bodily injury and property damage to a third party are also covered, and there 
is no environmental waiver in this policy. However, this type of full product liability insurance 
coverage is atypical. See N-VIRO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE INFORMATION SHEET (1998) (on file with authors). 
459 See Benbrook & Allbee, supra note 448, at 8. 
460 See DAVID L. ELKIND, WEF STOCK No.-CP3705 POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR BIOSOLIDS 
LAND ApPLICATION, AND THE USE OF INSURANCE TO MINIMIZE SUCH LIABILITY 16-3 (1997) 
(Presentation Before the Water Environment Federation Joint Residuals and Biosolid Specialty 
Conference on August 3-6, 1997) (on file with the authors). 
461 See id. at 16-5. 
462 [d. 
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a pollutant under the standard exclusion language.463 Both cases in-
volved sewage sludge that was disposed of at landfills prior to the 
promulgation of Part 503 regulations, but the courts' analyses remain 
pertinent. In City of Englewood v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 
the insurers argued that they had no duty to defend the city's disposal 
of municipal sewage sludge at a nearby landfill, because the disposal 
fell squarely within the pollution exclusion language in the insurance 
contract.464 However, the appeals court concluded that there was a 
legal basis on which insurers might be held liable to indemnify the 
cities because there is a "pending legal issue regarding the charac-
terization of domestic sewage sludge."466 Noting that courts have 
recognized a distinction between toxic industrial sludge and nontoxic 
domestic sewage sludge and stabilized sewage sludge,466 the appeals 
court cited a Colorado federal district court ruling in Metro Wastewa-
ter Reclamation District v. Continental Casualty Co., which rejected 
the proposition that sewage sludge, as a matter oflaw, was an irritant, 
contaminant, or pollutant.467 The Colorado state court in Englewood 
concluded that there was a mixed question of law and fact as to 
whether domestic sewage sludge is an irritant, contaminant, or pol-
lutant within the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause.468 
With the advent of Part 503, the ambiguity regarding whether 
sewage sludge is to be considered an irritant, contaminant, or pollut-
ant for pollution exclusion purposes is even more likely to be fact spe-
cific. It is important to note, however, that typical pollution exclusion 
language precludes coverage for bodily injury and property claims, 
but may not preclude coverage for "personal injury" claims.469 For 
example, in Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation District v. American 
463 See Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. v. Continental Cas. Co., 834 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 
(D. Colo. 1993); City of Englewood v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 940 P.2d 948, 954-55 
(Colo. App. 1996). 
464 See 940 P.2d at 954-55. 
465 I d. at 955. 
466 See Minerva Enters., Inc. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 851 S.W.2d 403, 406 (1993) (finding 
pollution exclusion ambiguous as to whether it applied to damage caused when a septic system 
backed up and flooded a mobile home because the definition of pollutant is intended to exclude 
industrial waste, not common household waste); Village of Cedarhurst v. Hanover Ins. Co., 611 
N.Y.S.2d 417, 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (finding natural municipal garbage not a pollutant; thus, 
exclusion did not apply to damage caused from overflow 'Of sewage system). 
467 See 834 F. Supp. at 1260. 
468 See City of Englewood, 940 P.2d at 955. 
469 Bodily injury claims are what most people think of as "personal injury." Some policies 
contain additional coverage which the industry calls "personal injury" coverage. Personal injury 
coverage includes intentional acts such as libel and slander, but of particular importance is that 
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Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., the court held that the pollution 
exclusion clause precluded property damage coverage for a complaint 
alleging damage from a POTW's discharge of pollutants in excess of 
federally permitted levels, but the court also held that the claim 
potentially fell under the policy's personal injury coverage, obligating 
the insurer to defend.470 However, this coverage was limited in Ter-
raMatrix, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., where the court 
held that personal injury coverage under the CGL policy is applicable 
only to entries or invasions committed by an owner, landlord or lesee, 
not by third persons.471 
The Springfield Farm Credit Bank Symposium participants agreed 
that there are still many unresolved questions relating to insurance 
coverage for land application of sewage sludge. The problems regard-
ing what environmental and liability risks are to be covered by poli-
cies, what mechanisms trigger claims against policies, and what evi-
dentiary burdens a claimant must meet, are yet to be resolved.472 In 
all likelihood, insurance companies will add to existing pollution ex-
clusion language specific limitations or other provisions unique to 
sewage sludge management.473 When that occurs, liability will again 
be governed by common law and statutory principles. 
C. Express Contractual Indemnification: The Preferred 
Risk-Sharing Mechanism 
The most readily available risk-sharing mechanism in the field of 
solid waste management is the indemnification contract.474 Claims for 
indemnification may arise because two parties have contracted to 
have one of them bear the expense of any judgment arising from the 
undertaking. This is called express indemnification. At the Springfield 
Symposium, it was agreed that: (1) POTWs generating sewage sludge 
should indemnify processors and others down the disposal chain 
against the risk that sewage sludge does not conform to the applicable 
Part 503 standards; (2) processors and handlers should indemnify 
farmersllandowners against the same risk, as long as the sewage 
some policies' personal injury coverage includes coverage for "'wrongful entry into ... premises 
that the person occupies' or similar acts, which some courts have held includes trespass claims." 
Elkind, supra note 460, at 16-5. 
470 See 856 F. Supp. 584, 585 (D. Colo. 1994). 
471 See 939 P.2d 483, 489 (Colo. App. 1997). 
472 See BENBROOK & ALBEE, supra note 448, at 8. 
413 See id. at 9. 
474 See id. 
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sludge is properly applied by the farmers; and lastly, that (3) farm-
ersllandowners applying sewage sludge themselves should indemnify 
processors, handlers, and generators against harm suffered as a result 
of farmers' negligence or failure to follow Part 503 regulations.475 
However, open-ended indemnification contracts can often be prob-
lematic because, as discussed above, the risks associated with sewage 
sludge application are often difficult to identify and subject to techni-
cal uncertainty.476 If generators are municipalities, large judgments 
against them will limit their ability to provide other essential services 
to residents. Furthermore, companies and farmers may be forced into 
bankruptcy if subject to large judgments. Thus, the Farm Credit 
Bank and EPA have sought to develop a workable model contract for 
indemnification, outlining the terms of liability.477 The purpose of such 
a venture is to develop model contract language that could be used 
across the nation. The model indemnification clause reads as follows478 
Contractor agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless [Land-
owner/Leaseholder] from and against any and all claims, suits, 
actions, demands, losses, costs, liabilities, and expenses (including 
remediation costs and reasonable attorney fees) to the extent 
such losses result from: (1) Contractor's or GeneratorlPreparer's 
violation of applicable laws or regulations in effect at the time of 
biosolid application; or (2) the negligence or willful misconduct of 
Contractor in the delivery and application of biosolids to the un-
dersigned Landowner's/Leaseholder's property. In the event this 
indemnification is enforced against the Contractor for a violation 
of law by a GeneratorlPreparer, Landowner/Leaseholder agrees 
to assign and subrogate to Contractor its claim against Gener-
atorlPreparer. This indemnification shall survive termination of 
this Agreement until the expiration of any applicable statutes of 
limitations. Landowner/Leaseholder shall promptly notify Con-
tractor in the event of a third-party claim and Contractor shall 
have the right to provide and oversee the defense of such claim 
and enter into any settlement of such a claim at its discretion 
(holding the landownerlleaseholder harmless). Landowner/Lease-
holder agrees to fully cooperate with Contractor in the defense 
against any third-party claim.479 
475 See id. at 9-10. Also note that although indemnification occurs most often in the form of 
contracts, it can be implied by the courts by examining the particular relationships among 
parties. 
476 See id. at 10. 
477 See Jane Forste, Indemnity Agreement Offers Protection to Bankers, 7 AM. BANKERS 
ASS'N J. OF AGRIC. LENDING 27, 28-29 (1994). 
478 Realistic indemnification devices should also take into account that compliance with the 
existing law might still result in damage. 
479 Forste, supra note 477, at 9. 
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The efficacy of such an agreement has yet to be tested in the courts. 
If societal concerns clearly seem to outweigh the interests in enforce-
ment of such language, then the above agreement may be unenforce-
able under grounds of public policy.480 Although this is true, courts 
have determined after much debate that there is no public policy 
against private parties bargaining over indemnification for CERCLA 
liability.481 So it is likely that "freedom of contract" would not be 
limited for sewage sludge. However, the clause's "any and all claims" 
language may be a source of future litigation. Does this language 
indicate an intent on the part of the Contractor to indemnify the 
ownerlleaseholder against liability based on the ownerlleaseholder's 
concurrent negligence with the contractor? The sole negligence of the 
owner is clearly not covered. Most importantly, what about strict 
liability claims? The court may look beyond the contract to general 
law and custom in determining if the quoted language indicates an 
intention to indemnify against an indemnitee's strict liability. This is 
clearly a gamble for indemnitees. 
Overall, the above contractual language demonstrates a move in the 
sewage sludge management arena towards a contractually governed 
system-a system where single contractors will carry out all the 
regulatory steps "in house" in order to reduce liability and transaction 
costs. Naturally, these companies want assurances from farmers that 
management requirements are being followed. This is now the role of 
the indemnification contract. The control of the sewage sludge arena 
by large companies makes sense, because "in reality ... indemnity 
agreements do not shift the loss, but shift the burden of paying for 
and procuring insurance."482 However, only large contractors can af-
ford liability coverage. 
This new contractually-based system has changed the nature of 
sewage sludge management litigation. A new breed of lawsuits is 
evolving, which focus solely on contractual questions. For example, in 
City of Reading v. Wheelabrator Water Technology, Inc., a dispute 
arose relating to whether Wheelabrator was entitled to a "change 
order" requiring the City to compensate it for an unforeseen increase 
in the cost of performing the contract.483 A "change order" was defined 
4!<l See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1991). 
481 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1); see also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
482 Spurr v. Acme Steel Co., 238 F. Supp. 606, 610 (N.D. Ill. 1964). 
4&3 No. Civ.A.97-7799, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4234, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1998). 
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by the contract as a written order to the contractor, signed by the 
owner, authorizing an addition or deletion to or revision in the work, 
or an adjustment in the contract price, issued after the effective date 
of the contract.484 After the contract was executed, it became evident 
that none of the sewage sludge collected from the city's wastewater 
treatment plant could be beneficially reused due to a problem with 
excess levels of molybdenum.485 Because all of the sewage sludge now 
had to be landfilled, the cost of performing the contract increased 
significantly. As a result, Wheelabrator requested a "change order" 
to the contract that would recognize these increased costs, but the 
city refused, arguing that it had sole discretion to either award or not 
award the order. Wheelabrator then requested arbitration pursuant 
to a provision within the contract. The arbitrator rejected the city's 
argument that Wheelabrator had assumed the risk of variations in the 
amount of reuseable sewage sludge, and awarded the change order. 
The district. court upheld the arbitrator's decision.486 This case is a 
prime example of the types of legal issues likely to emerge in the 
sewage sludge field. It is conceivable that most future suits, whether 
or not they involve questions of liability, will involve the interpreta-
tion of contract provisions. 
Another example of a contractual risk-sharing mechanism is the 
lease. Leases are often relied on in situations where "agricultural 
assessment" is employed in order to preserve farmland in rapidly 
developing areas. Under agricultural assessment statutes, owners of 
farmland pay property taxes based on the agricultural value of the 
land, as long as it remains in agriculture.487 If the owner wants to 
develop the farmland, he must pay a "rollback penalty" composed of 
the difference between property taxes based on agricultural and de-
velopment value over a certain number of prior years.488 
In states like New Jersey, which have adopted agricultural assess-
ment strategies, farmland is typically sold by farmers to developers, 
who lease the land back to the farmer-seller until market pressure 
dictates development of the farmland. Until this occurs, the devel-
484 [d. at *2. 
485 See id. at *3. 
486 See id. at *6. 
487 Where there is heavy development pressure on farmland, the agricultural value of the land 
may be as little as ten percent of the development value. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2 § 76-10 
(1999). 
486 In New Jersey, the rollback penalty period is three years. See N.J. STAT. tit. 54:4-23.8 
(1998). 
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oper-lessor will hold the property while paying comparatively low 
property taxes and collecting rent from the farmer-lessee. Since the 
sale-leaseback transaction is a prelude to the ultimate development 
of farmland, such a lease typically contains a prohibition on the appli-
cation of sewage sludge to the property under lease. 
Even the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
forbids sewage sludge application on lands subject to state-purchased 
conservation easements.489 In contrast, other divisions in the same 
Department favor sewage sludge application and regulate it as a 
fertilizer.490 These inconsistent sewage sludge management policies 
within a particular state agency are another example of conflicting 
and counterproductive attitudes towards land application of sewage 
sludge. 
CONCL US IONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
Some liability issues will remain intractable, even if Congress 
amends CERCLA and RCRA to preclude all possibility of govern-
mental and private actions to remediate sites and collect natural 
resource damages where sewage sludge has been land applied. Signifi-
cant exposure to liability will probably continue under state cleanup 
statutes and common law causes of action. 
This is an area of public policy pervaded by scientific uncertainty, 
and where there exists a substantial disjunction between governmen-
tal goals and public outrage. Among the scientific community, there 
is a principled and meaningful disagreement about whether current 
governmental regulation of land application will be effective in pro-
tecting public health and welfare. Federal and state governments are 
primarily concerned about disposal of the increasing amounts of sew-
age sludge, produced by POTWs, without ocean disposal or incinera-
tion.491 Members of the public, on the other hand, are more concerned 
about the quality of their individual drinking water supplies and their 
property values than about sewage sludge disposal in general. More-
over, the large agribusiness operations that are increasingly dominat-
489 The Deed of Easement for Farmland Preservation in New Jersey prohibits "waste" (which 
is currently defined as including sewage sludge) from being applied to the property. See N.J. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 2 § 7&-3.12(a)7 (1999). 
490 See Telephone Interview with Sherry Dudas, Right to Farm Program Specialist, State 
Agricultural Development Commission (July 15, 1998) (notes on file with the authors). 
491 Sewage sludge production has doubled since the enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972. 
See Leather Indus. of America v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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ing the agricultural sector do not evoke as much public sympathy as 
did the family farm, making successful lawsuits by neighbors more 
likely than in the past. In light of the scientific uncertainties and the 
disjunction between public goals, it is unlikely that states will be able 
to muster the political support necessary to amend their Right to 
Farm Acts so as to immunize abnormally dangerous activities (includ-
ing sewage sludge application) from common law suits by farmers 
or neighbors. The ambiguities regarding liability for land application 
will only exacerbate the siting disputes that are beginning to fester 
around the country. 
In order to expedite the beneficial reuse of sewage sludge through 
application on farmland, Congress should establish a liability indem-
nification fund that would indemnify actors in the sewage sludge 
management process who have complied with applicable federal and 
state law, for the costs of compensating farmers and neighbors who 
have suffered personal injury and property damage that can reason-
ably be attributed to the land application of sewage sludge. Such a 
governmental indemnity fund is necessary because the private insur-
ance market will continue to exclude sewage sludge application from 
liability coverage. 
The sewage sludge land application liability fund492 legislation would 
establish an administrative entity that is authorized to resolve dis-
putes (subject to judicial review) pursuant to strict limitations on 
liability (e.g., by excluding punitive damage claims). This board would 
also be empowered to utilize flexible approaches to identify causation 
of damage, such as the substantial factor test that has become the law 
in some states.493 In addition, the board would be authorized to award 
funding for medical surveillance in cases where substantial exposure 
has occurred but palpable symptoms have not yet appeared.494 Adher-
ing to the "Polluter Pays Principle," the fund should be at least 
partially financed by a tax on indirect discharges into POTWs. The 
tax would be based on the toxicity and volume of discharged materi-
als. Taxing indirect dischargers will counterbalance the indirect dis-
492 This model is loosely based on the fund established by the Price-Anderson Act to deal with 
liability concerns arising from the siting of nuclear power plants. See Price-Anderson Act, 42 
u.s.c. §§ 2011-2296 (1994). 
493 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 157, at 255-71. 
494 See, e.g., Ayres v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 298 (N.J. 1987) (residents who alleged 
that wells from which they received their drinking water were polluted by toxic waste leaking 
from a municipal landfill recovered damages for enhanced risk of future illness and medical 
surveillance). 
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charge subsidy. It will also stimulate pollution prevention because the 
alternatives to indirect discharge-hazardous waste disposal under 
RCRA and direct discharge into waterbodies under the CWA-are 
considerably more expensive and closely regulated than indirect dis-
charge into POTW s. 
A less desirable alternative to this indemnification mechanism 
would be federally subsidized insurance (similar to Federal Flood 
Insurance) or bond premiums for sewage sludge application.495 This 
approach, however, would militate against compensation because pri-
vate insurance or bonding companies would be the primary decision-
makers regarding claims for compensation. In light of the extensive 
scientific uncertainty regarding the public health effects of sewage 
sludge, this mechanism would be unfair to claimants. However, it 
could be administered by existing market actors and government 
agencies, without necessarily including a tax on indirect dischargers. 
Whatever compensation device is chosen, Congress must resolve 
the policy dichotomy between sewage treatment residuals perceived 
as potentially dangerous sewage sludge or benign, beneficial biosolids 
if the environmental loop regarding these residuals is to be satisfac-
torily closed. 
495 See Federal Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2414 (1994). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 Different types of sewage sludge and their characteristics. 1 
Type of Stabilization and Pathogen Properties Common Use as 
sewage Disinfection Reduction Use in stabilization 
sludge Methods Standard Land method for 
Met Application landfilling and 
incineration 
Liquid! Aerobic digestion,2 In most liquid (1-5% Nutrient Yes 
dewatered anaerobic cases solids content), source 
digestion,3 or lime Class B dewatered 
(12-30% 
solids content) 
Advanced Addition of lime Class A Relatively Mostly as Yes, as 
Alkaline material such as dry; liming landfill cover 
Stabilized quick lime, significant material only 
hydrated liming value 
lime, or cement 
kiln dust 
Composted Composting In most Relatively Soil Yes, as 
cases stable; amendment landfill cover 
Class A humus-like only 
Pelletized Drying sludge at Class A Dry, flows well Specialty Yes 




1. See U. Krogmann & L.S. Boyles, Rutgers Cooperative Extension, Land Application of Sewage 
Sludge (Biosolids), What is Sewage Sludge? (1999) (unpublished fact sheet on file with authors). 
2. Aerobic digestion - the degradation of concentrated wastewater solids, during which aerobic 
bacteria (bacteria which need the presence of oxygen) break down the organic matter into mostly inert 
solids, carbon dioxide and water. See id. 
3. Anaerobic digestion - the degradation of concentrated wastewater solids, during which anaerobic 
bacteria (bacteria which can not live in the presence of oxygen) break down the organic matter into 
mostly inert solids, carbon dioxide and methane. See id. 
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Table 2 Maximum cumulative pollutant loading for trace elements according to 1989 












1. See 54 Fed. Reg. 5746, 5880 (1989). 
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Table 3 Pollutant limits according to 40 CFR Part 5031 
Ceiling Pollutant Cumulative Annual 
Concentration Concentration Pollutant Pollutant 
(mglkg dry (mglkg dry Loading Loading Rate 
Pollutant sludge) sludge) (kg/ha) (kg/(ha * yr)) 
Arsenic 75 41 41 2.0 
Cadmium 85 39 39 1.9 
Chromium2 3,000 1,200 3,000 150 
Copper 4,300 1,500 1,500 75 
Lead 840 300 300 15 
Mercury 57 17 17 0.85 
Molybdenum3 75 18 18 0.90 
Nickel 420 420 420 21 
Selenium4 100 36 100 5.0 
Zinc 7,500 2,800 2,800 140 
1. See 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 9392 (1993). 
2. In Leather Industries of America v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1994), POTWs and 
privately-owned treatment works filed a petition with the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to review 
the pollutant limits for chromium. EPA concluded that there are no data justifying the chromium 
regulation and subsequently removed all limits from the regulations. See 60 Fed. Reg. 54,764, 
54,764-65 (1995). 
3. Climax Metals Company and several other companies filed a petition for EPA to reconsider the 
molybdenum limits. EPA concluded its limits were more restrictive than necessary and deleted the 
pollutant concentration, the cumulative loading, and the annual loading rate for molybdenum. 
However, new numerical limits will be promulgated in the future. See Standardfor Use or 
Disposal of Sewage Sludge, 59 Fed. Reg. 9095, 9096 (1995). 
4. The City of Pueblo, Colorado, filed a petition with the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit (transferred to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) to review 
the pollutant limits for selenium. See Leather Indus., 40 F.3d at 394; 60 Fed. Reg. at 54,764. The 
pollutant concentration for selenium is the 99th percentile value from the National Sewage Sludge 
Survey. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 54,764. Since the court required that the pollution concentration be 
risk-based, in 1995 EPA replaced the pollution concentration of 36 mg/kg with the risk-based limit 
of 100 mg/kg. See id. at 54,765. 
